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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,
Supreme Court Case No. 43551
Petitioner-Appellant,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

CLERK'S RECORD ON APPEAL

Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District, in and for the County of Ada.

HONORABLE CHERI C. COPSEY

STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

LAWRENCE G. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

· BOISE, IDAHO

000001

Fourth Judicial District Court - Ada County

Date: 10/28/2015
Time: 01:16 PM

User: TCWEGEKE

ROA Report
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Case: CV-PC-2015-02841 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey
Jimmy Dale Leytham, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Jimmy Dale Leytham, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

2/25/2015

MOAF

CCMURPST

Motion & Affidavit for Permission to Proceed on
Partial Payment of Court Fees

District Court Clerk

PETN

CCMURPST

Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

District Court Clerk

AFFD.

CCMURPST

First Affidavit of Petitioner

District Court Clerk

MOTN

CCMURPST

Motion to Take Judicial Notice of Underlying
Criminal Records and Transcripts

District Court Clerk

MISC

CCMURPST

Waiver of Attorney/ Client Privilege

District Court Clerk

MOTN

CCMURPST

Motion and Affidavit in Support for Appointment of District Court Clerk
Counsel

CERT

CCMURPST

Certificate Of Mailing

CHGA

CCMURPST

Judge Change: Administrative

Cheri Copsey (DUI
Court)

3/2/2015

CHGA

CCMURPST

Judge Change: Administrative

Cheri C. Copsey

3/4/2015

PROS

PRSMITTJ

Prosecutor assigned Shawna Dunn

Cheri C. Copsey

3/5/2015

MOTN

CCMYERHK

Motion For Scheduling Order

Cheri C. Copsey

3/9/2015

ORDR

CCMASTLW

Order Granting Appointment of Counsel

Cheri C. Copsey

HRSC

CCMASTLW

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference

Cheri C. Copsey

Judge

'District Court Clerk

04/15/2015 03:00 PM)
3/24/2015

NOAP

TCLAFFSD

Notice Of Appearance (Fuisting for Leytham)

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

TCLAFFSD

Motion To Release PSI

Cheri C. Copsey

MOTN

TCLAFFSD

Motion For Stay of Proceedings And For Leave
To Amend Petition

Cheri C. Copsey

3/26/2015

ORDR

CCMASTLW

Order Releasing PSI

Cheri C. Copsey

4/6/2015

MOTN

CCRADTER

Motion for Waiver of Attorney/Client Privilege

Cheri C. Copsey

4/10/2015

ORDR

CCMASTLW

Order for Waiver of Attorney/Client Privilege

Cheri C. Copsey

4/15/2015

DCHH

CCNELSRF

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Cheri C. Copsey
on 04/15/2015 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Susan Gambee
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: 50

HRSC

CCNELSRF

Hearing Scheduled (Review Hearing

Cheri C. Copsey

05/27/2015 03:00 PM)
STAT

CCMASTLW

STATUS CHANGED: inactive

Cheri C. Copsey

4/22/2015

MISC

CCMASTLW

Transcript Filed

Cheri C. Copsey

5/26/2015

MOTN

CCMYERHK

Motion For Permission To Conduct Deposition Of Cheri C. Copsey
Counsel, Brian Neville And Brian Blender

5/27/2015

DCHH

CCMASTLW

Hearing result for Review Hearing scheduled on Cheri C. Copsey
05/27/2015 03:00 PM: District Court Hearing Heh
Court Reporter: Kim Madsen
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50

5/29/2015

OBJT

CCHOLDKJ

Objection to Depositions
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Case: CV-PC-2015-02841 Current Judge: Cheri C. Copsey
Jimmy Dale Leytham, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant

Jimmy Dale Leytham, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant
Date

Code

User

6/3/2015

ORDR

DCDANSEL

Order Denying Motion for Discovery

Cheri C. Copsey

6/17/2015

HRSC

CCMASTLW

Hearing Scheduled (Status Conference
06/17/2015 04:00 PM)

Cheri C. Copsey

DCHH

CCMASTLW

Hearing result for Status Conference scheduled Cheri C. Copsey
on 06/17/2015 04:00 PM: District Court Hearing
Held
Court Reporter: Maria Glodowski
Number of Transcript Pages for this hearing
estimated: less than 50

6/30/2015

AFFD

CCSNELNJ

Second and Final Affidavit of Jimmy Leytham in
Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief

Cheri C. Copsey

7/8/2015

ORDR

CCMASTLW

Order Lifting Stay of Proceedings

Cheri C. Copsey

7/27/2015

ANSW

CCGRANTR

Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief
(Dunn for The State of Idaho)

Cheri C. Copsey

MOSJ

CCGRANTR

Motion For Summary Dismissal

Cheri C. Copsey

8/24/2015

OBJT

TCLAFFSD

Objection To Motion For Summary Dismissal

Cheri C. Copsey

8/28/2015

ORDR

DCDUMOKA

Order Granting Summary Judgment Dismissal

Cheri C. Copsey

JDMT

DCDUMOKA

Judgment

Cheri C. Copsey

CDIS

DCDUMOKA

Civil Disposition entered for: State Of Idaho,,
Other Party; Leytham, Jimmy Dale, Subject.
Filing date: 8/28/2015

Cheri C. Copsey

STAT

DCDUMOKA

STATUS CHANGED: Closed

Cheri C. Copsey

9/8/2015

NOTA

CCWRIGRM

NOTICE OF APPEAL

Cheri C. Copsey

9/10/2015

ORDR'

CCMASTLW

Order Appointing SAPD

Cheri C. Copsey

10/28/2015

NOTC

TCWEGEKE

Judge

Notice of Transcript Lodged - Supreme Court No. Cheri C. Copsey
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CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk

Jimmy D. Leytham
#16742, ISCI Unit 10
PO Box 14
Boise, ID 83707

8:, SEAN MURPHY
1

.CHER~ C. COPSEY

Petitioner

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
oOo
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM,

Case No.

Petitioner,
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VERIFIED PETITION FOR
POST-CONVICTION RELIEF

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
COMES NOW, Jimmy Dale Leytham, Petitioner prose, in the above-captioned
cause, pursuant to Sections 19-4901 - 4911, Idaho Code, presents this Verified
Petition for Post-Conviction Relief and alleges as follows:
1.

Petitioner is in the custody of the State Board of Corrections, housed

at the Idaho State Correctional Institution, Boise, Idaho.
2.

The sentencing court which imposed the judgment/sentence was the Fourth

Judicial District, County of Ada.
3.

4.

The case number and offense for the sentence imposed is:
a.

Case Number CR-FE-2014-0003478;

b.

Offense: COUNT II Forgery, Felony, Section 18-3601, Idaho Code.

Date of Sentence: December 31, 201'1, before the Honorable Cheri C. Copsey,

District Judge presiding.

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 1

000004

S.

Petitioner plead guilty pursuant to plea negotiations in which he

agreed to plead to COUNT II, Forgery, I.C. 18-3601, and Count(s) I and II
were dismissed.
6.

Other filings: Petitioner filed a timely notice of appeal on the

district court's Judgment of Conviction and Commitment Order.
7.

Petitioner has requested the appointment of conflict free counsel and

has submitted with this filing a Motion and Affidavit for Appointment of Conflict
Fee Counsel.
8.

Petitioner is seeking waiver of fees and costs in this matter and has

submitted a Motion and Affidavit for Permission to Proceed on Partial Payment
of Court Fees (Prisoner).
9.

Petitioner hereby sets forth the following claims for post-conviction

relief which are contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of clearly
established Federal and State Law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the
United States, and the conviction resulted in a decision that was based on an
unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in
the state district court proceedings.
Claim One
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel:
Failure to Conduct Investigation
Petitioners Trial Counsel, Brian P. Neville, was constitutionally ineffective
for failing to conduct a proper pre-trial investigation. As a result, this violated
Petitioners "right to counsel" and "due process of law" as guaranteed by the 6th
and 14th Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and Art. I, Section

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 2
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13 of the Constitution of the State of Idaho. See: Strickland v. Washington, 466

U.S. 668 (1984); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000); Wiggins v. Smith, 539
U.S. 510 (2003); among others.
Claim Two
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel:
Guilty Plea Ineffectiveness
Petitioners Trial Counsel, Brian P. Neville, was ineffective for failing to
make an adequate investigation into his case, and explanation of trial strategy,
prior to entering a guilty plea due to Trial Counsel's assurances that he would
receive probation by pleading guilty. As a result, this violated Petitioners
"right to counsel" and "due process of law", as guaranteed by the 6th and 14th
Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and Art. I, Sec. 13 of the
Constitution of the state of Idaho. See: Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668

1984); Hill v. Lockhart, 474 U.S. 52 (1985); Tollet v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258
1973); Padilla v. Kentucky, 130 S.Ct. 1473 (2010); Laffler v. Cooper, 132 S.Ct.
1376 (2012); Missouri v. Fry, 132 S.Ct. 1399 (2012); Booth v. State,151 Idaho
612, 617, 262 P.3d 255, 260 (2011); amons others.
Claim Three
Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel:
Breakdown In Communications Between Defendant and Counsel
Petitioners Trial Counsel, Brian P. Neville, was ineffective for failing to
communicate with Petitioner in order to subject the prosecution's case to a
meaningful adversary testing process. As a result, this violated Petitioners
"right to counsel" and "due process of law", as guaranteed by the 6th and 14th

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 3
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Amendments to the Constitution of the United States, and Art. I, Sec. 13 of the
Constitution of the state of Idaho. See: U.S. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984);

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685 (2002);
Daniels v. Woodford, 428 F.3d 1181 (9th Cir. 2005), among others.
10.

Petitioner further supports the above listed Federal Claims with a

statment of facts in the "First Affidavit of Petitione" that sets forth the
factual basis of his Federal Claims to this state Court and is incorporated
herein as if restated in its entirety.
11.

Petitioner seeks the following relief:
a)

ORDER respondent to respond to this Verified Petition within 30

days of filing in accordance with Idaho Code Section 19-4906(a);
b)

ORDER an evidentiary hearing to be held on these matters before

the state trial court pursuant to Idaho Code Section 19-4907 in order to properly
expand the record further;
c)

FIND and DECLARE for Petitioner on his Federal Constitutional

Claims presented herein, by addressing with aid of the First Affidavit of
Petitioner and Exhibits, underlying criminal records and transcripts; ISSUE
ITS WRIT for Post-Conviction Relief VACATING the Judgment of Conviction and
Commitment Order for Petitioner would have entered plea negotiations in a
completely different posture; and
d)

GRANT any further relief that justice may so permit.

Respectfully submitted this

.i!:L_ day

of

~~__.b__·~~~'

2015.

rmf¥~
Jimmy Dale

eyt am,

etitioner

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 4
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VERIFICATION
STATE OF IDAHO

)
ss.

County of Ada
I, JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, being sworn under oath states follows:
I am the Petitioner in the above-captioned VERIFIED PETITION FOR POSTCONVICTION RELIEF, and have read the contents therein, and that all statements
are true and correct to the best of my knowledge and belief.

SUBSCRIBED, SWORN and AFFIRMED to before me this'2:1._ day o f ~ ~
2015.

Notary Public for Id~
\
Commission expires: ~ e )

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 5
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I certify that I placed an original of the foregoing in the Prison Legal
Mail System to be filed by the Clerk of the Court and a true and correct copy
to be forwarded via U.S. Mail to:
Original to:
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk
Ada County District Court
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702-7300
Copy to:
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front St. Rm. 3191
Boise, ID 83702-7300

tr ~a~

'l,-/9·'J...Plf
L~Petitioner

Date

VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF - 6
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NO·-----==___,..,,,.._ __

g':s-z.

FILED
A.M. _ _ _ _
,P.M. _ _ __

FEB 2 5 2015

Jimmy D. Leytham
Full Name of Party Filing Document

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By SEAN MURPHY

#16742, ISCI Unit 10

Dt:PUTY

Mailing Address (Street or Post Office Box)

PO BOX 14
City, State and Zip Code

Boise, ID 83707
Telephone

IN THE DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EQIJRTH

JUDICIAL DISTRICT

FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF _A__
DA________

111
#
'
·1
1

JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM
vs.

Case No.

Petitioner,

'4J
I

.

r-, fJ IJ • "
i._~ {) ·!.!, .i

~.., I",'. ~
I

----------

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR
PERMISSION TO PROCEED ON PARTIAL
PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)

STATE QE IDAHO
Respondent.

IMPORTANT NOTICE: Idaho Code§ 31-3220A requires that you serve upon counsel for
the county sheriff, the department of correction or the private correctional facility,
whichever may apply, a copy of this motion and affidavit and any other documents filed
in connection with this request. You must file proof of such service with the court when
you file this document.

. Petitioner

asks to start or defend this case on partial payment of court fees,

and swears under oath
1. This is an action for (type of case)

. I

Post-Conviction Relief Action

believe I am entitled to get what I am asking for.
2. Ix] I have not previously brought this claim against the same party or a claim based on
the same operative facts in any state or federal court.

D I have filed this claim against the

same party or a claim based on the same operative facts in a state or federal court.
3. I am unable to pay all the court costs now.

I have attached to this affidavit a current

statement of my inmate account, certified by a custodian of inmate accounts, that reflects the
activity of the account over my period of incarceration or for the last twelve (12) months,
whichever is less.

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)

PAGE 1
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4. I understand I will be required to pay an initial partial filing fee in the amount of 20% of the
greater of: (a) the average monthly deposits to my inmate account or (b) the average monthly
balance in my inmate account for the last six (6) months. I also understand that I must pay the
remainder of the filing fee by making monthly payments of 20% of the preceding month's
income in my inmate account until the fee is paid in full.
5. I verify that the statements made in this affidavit are true. I understand that a false
statement in this affidavit is perjury and I could be sent to prison for an additional fourteen (14)
years.
(Do not leave any items blank. If any item does not apply, write "N/A". Attach additional pages if more space is needed for
any response.)

IDENTIFICATION AND RESIDENCE:
Name:

Address:

Other name(s) I have used: _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Jimmy Dale Leytham

#16742, ISCI Unit 10, PO BOX 14, Boise, ID 83707

How long at that address?

/ tJ {} f),'-'f -

Year and place of birth: / ~

ZJagC//VLe__ :?.()

Phone: ~

/Jo No-f JVO

DEPENDENTS:
I am D single [&1 married. If married, you must provide the following information:

ifa yGe-. It /... Qyf-iyorn.
'l6t' w t3 d1'.5 e st'' kh 11/1), ;£,/] ~ <?J61y
Name of spouse:

My other dependents including minor children (use only initials and age to identify children) are: _ _ __

/Ve!

I(/~

INCOME:
Amount of my income: $

:;i: u/~5 a,fJ

/J,'J~);d'fJ.f

3rY: uu

per

o week~ month w, ·~

~t,f-- p:.I /'f'vc~{l-<-

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)
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Other than my inmate account I have outside money from:
/

~

I

h

e U €(.l y

IX/

My spouse's income:

J'"tce ~v<f~

l-</ JZ-fl i,,(r:.

$38"Y-·cd

perOweek~month.

ASSETS:
List all real property (land and buildings) owned or being purchased by you.

Your
Address

City

Legal
Description

State

~61Jw St11'.se Sr k,17 IV~

Value

w .JtJl'Jv

Jlji·t'
0 W./L

Equity

~

J '31.: e,vU

List all other property owned by you and state its value.

Description (provide description for each item)

IYIY !.vi& 3;,y. tW

Cash

Value

/Yl<'tv/i,, ·

________________

;;;....
Notes and Receivables- ~ . . ./vtl
µ-e_,

Vehicles

/9<i7 fvtl../J fJ,'ck tfl f'CJo,c:01--odb f?:>A1Je>&f)/a1<~A. t~o,,d) ~ · ·

Bank/Credit Union/Savings/Checking Accounts

CAI if;,$/

i-d.

J'o ,c:,u

Stocks/Bonds/Investments/Certificates of Deposit_ _ _ _-"-M-~_M_~
___

Jl/O ,lf./e
-----------------------

Trust Funds

Retirement Accounts/lRAs/401 (k)s._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _;_µ_v_/f/_e:____
Cash Value lnsurance_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ ___..,A&---'-_//1_<.-_ _ __
Motorcycles/Boat~/Snowmobiles._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

C,oo,m

Furniture/Appliances._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

j#S'A:P

Jewelry/Antiques/Collectibles_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

/00,CP

Description (provide description for each item)
TVs/Stereos/Computers/Electronics

11/,

/PCJ ,ca

St,efto S-ortt>

Cb ;tJ/Jlffr,A /ft(l ,tfXJ

I/Git/()
1tt a /S
Sporting Goods/Guns._ _
f __, ....~·--4__,_/J_D_/(__$..___ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

Tools/Equipment

Horses/Livestock/Tack

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)
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•
EXPENSES: (List all of your monthly expenses.)
Average
Monthly Payment

Expense
RenUHouse Payment_

_,_'f__.S:...__4'-=-'-~--------------

2o 'J...,c<J

Vehicle Payment(s)_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _M;__o__;.~---'=--Credit Cards (List last four digits of each ao::ount number.)

Loans (name of lender and reason for loan)

Electricity/Natural Gas
Water/Sewer/Trash

--------------------

Phone

-----------------------

Groceries

Clothing _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
Auto Fuel._ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

%-S-d

Auto Maintenance

-yo

Cosmetics/Haircuts/Salons

1,.6,0 ~3~

--------------------------------------

EntertainmenVBooks/Magazines_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

,al-e,V~

0

w____/ __f.A,,,
___.....P_,N....,.........1/J1114'1
. . . . . . . . . . ._____

Home lnsurance_ _ _ _ _ _

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)
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Average
Monthly Payment

Expense

fr// J111/-G

Auto Insurance

.. _,, -~

~~~ bf'll,0¥,-K

Life Insurance

---------------------

MedicaI lnsurance.._/_~
_ _....___ _&_k
___

__,C/..
..........
1-t....
fv_"_______

+'_.

Medical Expense_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _
fJ,_'e)l_cfllPi
__.--'--'-~~µ
_ __

~d]
~.~~

IQO,t:-(J

~

Other _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

MISCELLANEOUS:

How much can you borrow? $

lt/0 ~

When did you file your last income tax return?

From whom?

?-,ol5 kJ,

WtJod17 ·-<

Amount of refund:$ ()(.)lt/f-' JU~

PERSONAL REFERENCES: (These persons must be able to verify information provided.)

Name

Address

Phone

Years Know~~~J

9{;-9Jl9
Jimmy Dale Leytham
Typed/printed

STATE OF IDAHO
County of

)
) ss.
}

ADA

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me on this

11

day of

~ ?t,/:S-

Nota~
Residing at
Commission expires
1'

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT FOR PERMISSION TO PROCEED
ON PARTIAL PAYMENT OF COURT FEES (PRISONER)
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~

~
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..

NO·----...,,.,,..,=--,~~=----

FILED
(?,-s
A.M. _ _ _ _ _
P.M. _
_ '2...
__

FEB 2 5 2015

Jimmy D. Leytham
#16742, ISCI Unit 10
PO Box 14
Boise, ID 83707

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By SEAN MURPHY
DEP\JH

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
oOo

,···

JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM,

;'>'

Case No.
Petitioner,

J

,;¥ R"'
·,

-------------

FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
STATE OF IDAHO

)

County of ADA

)

ss.
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, being sworn under oath deposes and states as follows:
1.

I am the petitioner in the above-captioned cause, and presents the

following to support the Claims I have set froth in my Petition for Post-Conviction
Relief that is presently before this Court for its consideration.
2.

I am over the age of 18 years of age and competent to offer the following

statements.
3.

I was told my attorney was from the firm of Bender Law Office, and that

my attorneys name was Mr. Brian Nevell.
4.

Mr Brian Nevell told me that he needed to recuse Judge Nevell because

he was a relative of Brian Nevell. (Father).
5.

During the entire time that Brian Nevell was my attorney, I placed more than

FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER - 1

000015

twenty, (20), telphone calls to his Office for him. He never returned any of
my calls. Not one time.
6.

I believe that Mr. Nevell was appointed to my case in February of

7.

I asked Mr. Nevell numerous times to try to get me a binding Rule 11

2014.

plea agreement. He stated to me, "Judge Copsy will not allow those".
8.

I asked Mr. Nevell to recuse Judge Copsy. He told me, "Why, she is

fair". He, (Mr. Nevell), then informed me that he and his family, and Judge
Copsy are such good friends that they spend the holidays together with their
families.
9.

I was scheduled for a Court hearing on September 10th, 2014. I

spoke to Mr. Nevell and he told me that he would contact me on the 7th, of
September, 2014, to see if I could reschedule the Court date of the 10th.
I asked this to be rescheduled because I had a job out of town and I did
not know if I could get back before the Court date.
10.

Mr. Nevell never did contact me as to whether or not my Court date

was rescheduled.
11.

When I returned from out of town, I did make it to my Court date on

the 10th, of September, 2014. However, Mr. Nevell did not show up. He forgot
about me, and my Court date. A Mr. Brian Bender filled in for Mr. Nevell; but
Mr. Bender did not know about my case.
12.

My Wife called Mr. Nevell's telephone several times to find out what

was going on and what happened to him at the Court date. There was never any
type of return call from Mr. Nevell.
13.

When I spoke to Mr. Nevell in person, he explained that he had this

FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER - 2
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.,

"great deal" worked out for me. I explained to Mr. Nevell that I did not
want to enter into a guilty plea as I was not guilty.
14.

Mr. Nevell informed me, " •• hey, do not worry about it, just plead

guilty, and they are going to give to you probation".
15.

At the time I appeared before the Court, the Court read to me the

Guilty plea advisory form. When I was asked if, " ••• there has been any type of
promises to you," Mr. Nevell told me to say that there was no promises. I asked
about the probation he had promised, Mr. Nevell told me, " ••• that is not what
the Court is asking about".
16.

I informed Mr. Nevell, "sir, I need some time to think about this".

Mr. Nevell told me, "Hey, this is a done deal, you are going to get probation,
so you have about 15 minutes, just plead guilty and you will get probation".
17.

I did as my attorney advised me to do. I entered the plea of guilty.

However, when the Court sentenced me, I received a sentence of ten, (10) years.
Five years fixed or determinate, followed by five years indeterminate.
18.

I do not believe that Mr. Nevell was truthful in this case. He coerced

me into a plea of guilty under the promise that I would only receive a term of
probation.
19.

I do not believe that Mr. Nevell effectively represented me in this

case. I believe that he had an interest in not making his family friend, Judge
Copsy, made at him for seeking a binding Rule 11 plea agreement.
20.

I believe that Mr. Nevell placed his interest before my interests. I

was told that I would receive a term of probation. I did not, and I have been
harmed by the misrepresentations of Mr. Brian Nevell.

FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER - 3
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OATII OF AFFIANT

I, Jimmy D. Leytham, do hereby Swear, under the penalty of perjury, as
applicable to me under the laws of the State of Idaho, that the information
contained in this affidavit are true and correct to the best of my knowledge.

f..-19'-!PIJ
Dated

SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN TO before me t h i s ~ day of February, 2015.

the
at,

Notary
State of

'I

My Comm~~M on,

:~;-~~#: ·.~-)

OF.

ID~-;,

FIRST AFFIDAVIT OF PETITIONER - 4
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NO. _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
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FILED
A.M. _ _ _ _ _
P.M. .,&
_._ _,,

FEB 2 5 2015

Jimmy D. Leytham
#16742, ISCI Unit 10
PO Box 14
Boise, ID 83707

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By SEAN MURPHY
DEPUl"Y

Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
oOo
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM,

q q
O 1''. 4J r ,-, .,..'°11 r; .. 1
Case No; _:.__,_._. --'-·_. ,_\_.-'....(_.'fi_.,.-~_1""4"""·"'-"lr1

Petitioner,
MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE OF
THE UNDERLYING CRIMINAL RECORDS
AND TRANSCRIPTS

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
COMES NOW, Jimmy Dale Leytham, Petitioner prose, in the above-captioned
cause, pursuant to Rule 201(d), of the Idaho Rules of Evidence, moves this Court
for an Order to take judicial notice of the underlying criminal records and
transcripts in the case of State of Idaho v. Jimmy Dale Leytham, Case Number
CR-FE-2014-0003478, Ada County, to include but not limited to the following:

1.

The entire underlying criminal record;

2.

Transcript from the underlying criminal case, to include the guilty

plea hearing, and sentencing hearing;
3.

The Guilty Plea Advisory Form that was used at the Guilty Plea Hearing;

4.

The Presentence Investigation Report;

S.

The Clerk's Record and Reporters Transcript which was lodged in the

appeal of the Judgment of Conviction and Commitment Order;
6.

The Presentence Investigation Report.

MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE - 1
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
A post-conviction relief proceeding is not an extension of the criminal case
from which it arises. Rather, it is a separate civil action in which the applicant
hears the burden of proof imposed upon a civil plaintiff. Paridis v. State, 110

Idaho 534, 536, 716 P.2d 1306 (Idaho 1986). No part of the record from the
criminal case becomes part of the record in the post-conviction proceeding
unless it is entered as an exhibit. Exhibits, as well as transcripts of the
pre-trial proceedings, the trial, and sentencing hearing in the criminal case,
even if previously prepared as a result of a direct appeal or otherwise, are not
before the trial court in the post-conviction proceeding and do not become part
of the record on appeal unless presented to the trial court as exhibits. Roman

v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 647, 873 P.2d 898, 901 (Ct.App. 1994); Wolf v. State,
152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169, 1172 (Ct.App. 2011), or unless the trial court
takes judicial notice of such records from the criminal case. Idaho Rules of
Evidence 201. Esqivel v. State, 149 Idaho 255, 258, n.3 233 P.3d 186, 189 n.3

(Ct.App. 2010). See also Schultz v. State, 153 Idaho 791, 799 (Ct.App. 2012).
Based upon the foregoing it is requested this Court take judicial notice
of the underlying criminal records and transcripts, and those other documents
that are identified above as an Exhibit, and grant any further relief justice
may so allow.
DATED this

Jj__

day of

_h_-e._lJ____·_____ ,

2015.

MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE - 2

000020

J

'
.-

.
VERIFICATION
I, JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, certify (or declare) under penalty of perjury pursuant

to Idaho Code Section 19-1406, that the foregoing is true and correct to the best
of my knowledge and belief.

b,

1, -

1,.0/f

Date

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I submitted an original to the Clerk of the Court for
filing and a true and correct copy via the Prison Legal Mail System to be
forwarded via the U.S. Mail to:
Original to:
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk
Fourth District Court
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702-7300
Copy to:
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
200 W. Front St. Rm. 3191
Boise, ID 83702-7300

Date

MOTION TO TAKE JUDICIAL NOTICE - 3
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NO.-----:=::-;:,:::-----:::---FILED
A.M. _ _ _ _ _P.M.-"""'-="-----

~S2

FEB 2 5 2015
Jimmy D. Leytham
#16742, ISCI Unit 10
PO Box 14
Boise, ID 83707

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By SEAN MURPHY
DEPUTY

Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
oOo

CV PC 1 S

JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM,
Petitioner,

Case No.
·
Ref: -CR---F-E--2-0-1-4--0-0-0~3-48=7---WAIVER OF ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
I, JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM, do hereby acknowledge the following:
1.

I have submitted to the District Court a Verified Petition for

Post-Conviction Relief for its consideration, and have asked for the Court
to appoint conflict free counsel to represent me in these matters.
2.

I was represented by Brian P. Neville, Attorney at Law, in Ada

County Case CR-FE-2014-0003487, in which I plead guilty to the offense of
Forgery, a violation of Idaho Code Section 18-3601.
3.

The testimony of Mr. Neville regarding CR-FE-2014-0003487 is vital

to my Verified Petition for Post-Conviction Relief which is submitted with
this Wavier of Attorney/Client Privilege for the Court's consideration.
4.

By signing this document, I hereby waive my attorney/client

privilege in CR-FE-2014-0003487.

WAIVER OF ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE - 1
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•
DATED this

STATE OF IDAHO
County of ADA

J!l_ day

r_. .

of ___ -e_b;;___.- - - - - ' 2015.

)
: ss.
)

,

ON t h i s ~ day of ~~t
2015, before me a Notary Public in
and for this State of Idaho, person~lly and in person appeared JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM
and proved to me on the basis of satisfactory evidence to be the person named in
and who executed the foregoing Waiver of Attorney/Client Privilege and acknowledged
to me that he executed the same as his voluntary act and deed for the uses and
purposes therein mentioned.
WITNESS my hand and official seal the day and year first above written.

Nota--;;i,"ii,. for Ida~
Commission expires

I

: f'P-zeJ
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I submitted an original of the foregoing to the Clerk
of the Court for filing and a true and correct copy via the Prison Legal Mail
System to be forwarded via the U.S. Mail to:
Original to:
Christopher D. Rich, Clerk
Ada County District Court
200 W. Front St.
Boise, ID 83702-7300
Copy to:
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney:
200 W. Front St. Rm. 3191
Boise, ID 83702-7300

WAIVER OF ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE - 3
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NO·----;=;-:-::::::-----:-~-FILED
AM. _ _ _ _ _
P.M.-..
_______
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FEB 2 5 20!5
CHRISTOPHER D, RICH, Clerk

Inmate name Jimmy D. Leytham
IDOC No. 16742, !SCI Unit 10
Address PO Box 14
Boise, ID 83707

By SEAN MURPHY
DE~UTY

Petitioner
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE -FOURTH
- - - - - - - JUDICIAL DISTRICT
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF-'A=D=A_ _ _ __
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

CVCasePC
1502841
No.
-----

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN
SUPPORT FOR
APPOINTMENT OF
COUNSEL

(CONFLICT FREE)

)

COMES NOW, Jimmy Dale Leytham

, Petitioner in the above

entitled matter and moves this Honorable Court to grant Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of
Counsel for the reasons more fully set forth herein and in the Affidavit in Support of Motion for
Appointment of Counsel.
1.

Petitioner is currently incarcerated within the Idaho Department of Corrections

under the direct care, custody and control of Warden__
K_e_it_h_Y_o_r_d..._y_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __..
ofthe Idaho State Correctional Instituiton, Boise.
2.

The issues to be presented in this case may become to complex for the Petitioner

to properly pursue. Petitioner lacks the knowledge and skill needed to represent him/herself.
3.

Petitioner required assistance completing these pleadings, as he/she was unable to
do it him/herself

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 1
Revised: I 0/14/05
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4.

Petitioner is claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel and therefore
needs conflict free counsel appointed in these matters.
DATED this 1!!f_ day of~E??..6-·
-=.,.----1.-'--_ _ _ __,, 20 )£_.

AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

)
) ss
County of_. .A
. ....D""'A____ )
STATE OF IDAHO

J~I=MMY~-'D""'A'"'"L~E~L=E_YTH_AM
_ _ _ _~, Petitioner, after first being duly sworn upon his/her
oath, deposes and says as follows:

I.

I am the Affiant in the above-entitled case;

2.

I am currently residing at the

Idaho State Correctional Instituiton

under the care, custody and control ofWarden_K_e_i_t_h_Y_o_r_d_y_ _ _ _ __

3.

I am indigent and do not have any funds to hire private counsel;

4.

I am without bank accounts, stocks, bonds, real estate or any other form of real

property;

5.

I am unable to provide any other form of security;

6.

I am untrained in the law;

7.

If I am forced to proceed without counsel being appointed I will be unfairly

handicapped in competing with trained and competent counsel of the State;
Further your affiant sayeth naught.
MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 2
Revised: 10/14/05
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. .
'

WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully prays that this Honorable Court issue
it's Order granting Petitioner's Motion for Appointment of Counsel to represent his/her interest,
or in the alternative grant any such relief to which it may appear the Petitioner is entitled to.
DATED This _d day of

~

, 20..f._£.

~Wt~
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN AND AFFIRMED to before me this

fl day

~
,.-of _ _
~~"'-=-'----''
20_LL.

(SEAL)

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing via
Prison Legal Mail System to be forwarded via U.S. Mail to:

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR
200 W. Front St. Rm. 3191
Boise, ID 83702-7300

~O·~
JimmyD. Leytham

-J,i- I t:J- -u:,!J
Date

MOTION AND AFFIDAVIT IN SUPPORT FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL - 3
Revised: 10/14/05
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FILED
Wednesday, February 25. 2015 at 09:11 AM
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, CLERK OF THE COURT

4---· -~;t"

BY:

De utyClerk

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
CASE NO. CV-PC-2015-02841

Jimmy Dale Leytham,
Plaintiff,
vs.

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

State of Idaho,
Defendant.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
mailed, by United States Mail, one copy of the: VERIFIED PETITION FOR POST

CONVICTION RELIEF as notice pursuant to Rule 77 (d) I.R.C.P. to each of the parties or
attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes addressed as follows:
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
(INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL)
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
(COPY IN FILE)
Jimmy D. Leytham # 16742
ISCI Unit 10 PO Box 14
Boise, Idaho 83707

r-i~~:::1~~;:,!!r
~ r( r'

... i' ',)
"·""%,"t':.,i',('

-~

ii ._/',,·.~ ·'

Dated: ~~dri:esday, Febniaty25, 2015
CHRI~QPHER Q. RICH

Clerk."Ofth~ Court .

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

1/1

,

2/25/2015

Court Reference
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CJ:-r C,:,ps,rq
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•
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Fl~.M

~ ~~~~

_

MAR O5 2015
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By MAURA OLSON
DEPUTY

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Shawna Dunn
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
ISB No. 5287
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841
MOTION FOR SCHEDULING
ORDER

COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County
of Ada, State of Idaho, in the above entitled matter, and moves this Court for a scheduling
order permitting filing of the Answer more than thirty days from the filing of the petition.
The petitioner has moved for post-conviction relief and has requested counsel. In the
event that counsel is appointed, the landscape of the post-conviction claims may vary
widely from the current petition. Idaho Code 19-4906 provides that the Answer is due
within 30 days, "or within any further time the court may fix." The State asks that the Court

MOTION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER (LEYTHAM) Page 1

1
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•
fix the due date of the Answer after the decision on the defendant's motion for counsel. The
State asks for sufficient time from the issuance of the Court's order to provide an Answer.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this

~
K Alday o:CF@bruary,
2015.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecutor

Shawna Dunn
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVI_<jf,,.

AJA

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this ~ a y o f ~ ~ 5, a true and correct
copy of the foregoing State's Motion for Scheduling Order was served to: in the manner
noted below:
Jimm)' D. Leytham, IDOC No. 16742, ISCI Unit 10, PO Box 14, Boise, Idaho 83707

~ depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid,
first class.
CJ

By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

CJ

By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for
pickup at the Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.

CJ

By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the fac

MOTION FOR SCHEDULING ORDER (LEYTHAM) Page 2

2
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•

-

No.---liiiali!j~~--,1--

A.M_ _ _ __,

MAR og 2c:5

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL D~IPl'ffleR D. RICH,'"'' 'rl
By BETH MASTERS

1

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

DEPurv

2

JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,
3

Petitioner,

4
5

vs.

6

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

7

Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841
ORDER
GRANTING APPOINTMENT
OF COUNSEL

Res ondent.

8

On January 2, 2015, in Case No. CR-FE-2014-0003478, the Court imposed an aggregate

9

sentence of ten (10) years with five (5) years fixed followed by five (5) years indeterminate on
Count II, Forgery, Felony, LC. § 18-3601. In CR-FE-2014-0005269, the Court imposed an

10

aggregate sentence of five (5) years with zero (0) years fixed followed by five (5) years
11

12

indeterminate on Count II, Criminal Possession of a Financial Transaction Card, Felony, LC. § 183125, -3128, to run consecutively to CR-FE-2014-0003478. He was represented by Brian Neville.

13

Leytham appealed and that appeal is pending. Leythma filed a post-conviction Petition on

14

February 25, 2015, and requested the Court appoint counsel. Based on the documents in the file,

15

pursuant to LC.§§ 19-4904, 19-852,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the Ada County Public Defender is appointed to represent

16

the Defendant in prosecuting the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief. The appointed counsel is to
17

file a Notice of Appearance within 20 days. The State shall not answer the Petition at this time.

18

Furthermore, the Court hereby provides the Ada County Public Defender and Ada County

19

Prosecutor's Office copies of the Petition, accompanying memoranda, any transcripts and requests

20

the Public Defender review them to determine if conflict counsel should be appointed. A status

21

conference is scheduled for April IS: 2015, at 3:00 p.m. Counsel for Leytham and for the State
shall appear. The Court further orders Leytham has waived his attorney client privilege. The

22

Defendant shall not file any more material pro se.
23
24

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 9th day of March 2015.

25

26

ORDER GRANTING APPPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
CASE NO. CV-PC-2015-02841
1
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•
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•

The undersigned authority hereby certifies that on 1_kz_ March 2015 I mailed, by United
1

States Mail, one copy of the ORDER GRANTING APPPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL as notice
2
3

pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the attorneys of record in this cause in envelopes
addressed as follows:

4
5
6

GREG H. BOWER
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
KAI WITTWER
SHAWNA DUNN

7

8
9

10

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE
AUGUST CAHILL
BRIAN NEVILLE
300 W. MYRTLE STREET, STE. 200
BOISE, ID 83702

11

12
13

14

JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM
#16742
I.S.C.I. UNIT 10
PO Box 14
Boise, ID 83707
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

15

16
17

Date:

-~3-_,t~o-l=._;~----

By

~ltL~ji . ~ ··

Deputycferk

c..,

"

.

18
19
20

21
22

23
24
25

26

ORDER GRANTING APPPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL
CASE NO. CV-PC-2015-02841
2
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MAR 2 4 2015
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By HALEY MYERS
DEPUTY

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CV-PC-2015-2841

Plaintiff,
NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
vs.

JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,
Defendant.

TO:

The state of Idaho, by and through the Ada County Prosecutor, and to this
Honorable Court.
YOU, AND EACH OF YOU, are hereby notified that pursuant to the Court's ORDER

appointing the Office of the Ada County Public Defender on March 9, 2015, the defendant
above-named is now being represented and is appearing in the above-entitled action by and
through the Ada County Public Defender-LANCE L. FUISTING, Deputy Public Defender,
appearing on behalf of the }\da County Public Defender for the defendant above-named.
DATED, this 2!rdday of March 2015.

CFJTm~

LANC~
Attorney for Defendant

1

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE
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•
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this

1/~ day of March 2015, I mailed a true and

correct copy of the within instrument to:
SHAWNA DUNN
Deputy Prosecutor, Ada County

by placing said same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

NOTICE OF APPEARANCE

2

000034

•

NO.
A.M.

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorney for Defendant

~'\)
\0
-~
_P.M. _ _ __
ALED

MAR 24 2015

Lance Fuisting
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83 702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By HALEY MYERS
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Plaintiff,

Case No. CR-FE-2014-0003478
CR-FE-2014-0005269
(Civil Case Ref: CV-PC-2015-2841)

vs.

MOTION TO RELEASE PSI
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,
Defendant.

COMES NOW, LANCE L. FUISTING of the Ada County Public Defender's Office,
court-appointed counsel for JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, and moves this Court, pursuant to
Idaho Criminal Rule 32, for an order releasing the presentence investigation report prepared
in the above-entitled case number to undersigned counsel.
The defendant recently filed a Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in Case No. CV-PC-

2015-2841. Subsequent to petitioner's filing, the Ada County Public Defender's Office was
appointed to represent the above-named defendant in post-conviction proceedings. To aid
undersigned counsel in the post-conviction proceedings and familiarize counsel with the
defendant's case, counsel respectfully requests this Court release a copy of the presentence
investigation report generated in the above-entitled case number.
DATED this 2Yd day of March 2015.

L~
~

LANCE L. FUISTING
Attorney for Defendant

1

MOTION TO RELEASE PSI
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this 23rct day of March 2015, I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to SHAWNA DUNN, Ada County Prosecutor's Office, by placing the
same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

Quincy K. Harris

MOTION TO RELEASE PSI

2
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e

~.: \Q~ ::'%____
MAR 2 4 2015
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By HALEY MYERS
DEPUTY

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorney for Petitioner
Lance Fuisting
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,
Case No. CV-PC-2015-2841

Petitioner,
MOTION FOR STAY OF
PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEAVE
TO AMEND PETITION

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

COMES NOW the petitioner, JIMMY D. LEYTHAM, by and through his attorney,
LANCE FUISTING, Ada County Public Defender's Office, and moves this Court for an
order staying proceedings and allowing the petitioner to amend his petition after a
discussion of issues with appointed counsel. The petitioner requests a stay of 90 days in
order to review the file, receive and review a copy of the presentence investigation report,
receive and review transcripts, and prepare an amended petition.
DATED this 2Yd day of March 2015.

Attorney for Petitioner

~

1

MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION
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•
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this z3rct day of March 2015, I mailed a true and correct
copy of the foregoing to SHAWNA DUNN, Ada County Prosecutor's Office, by placing the
same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

f{Lv4/4~
iJ-

Quincy K. Harris

MOTION FOR STAY OF PROCEEDINGS AND FOR LEAVE TO AMEND PETITION

2

000038

Re,cE\\JEO

.

•

~

,..

\4~R 1 ~ '",

C\er\<.
J)..d'a ~~ COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorney for Defendant

W.m,~

FILED

\ •

~u

.ul·----P.M._....-J_

MAR 26 2~~5

Lance Fuisting
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, 1....,";
By BETH MASTERS
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
STATE OF IDAHO,
Case No. CR-FE-2014-0003478eR-FE-2014•0005269
(Civil Case Ref: CV-PC-2015-2841)

Plaintiff,
vs.

ORDER RELEASING PSI

JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,
Defendant.
This matter having come before the court upon court-appointed counsel's motion, and
for good cause appearing, this Court hereby grants counsel's Motion to Release PSI.
A copy of the presentence investigation report prepared on behalf of the defendant in the
above-entitled case number shall be made available for review to LANCE L. FUISTING,
court-appointed counsel for the defendant in Case No. CV-PC-2015-2841, to aid counsel in
preparation of the pending post-conviction proceedings.
Counsel is to make no copies of the report, shall not disclose the report to any other
person outside the Ada County Public Defender's Office, and shall surrender said copy to
this Court upon completion of the defendant's post-conviction proceedings in Case No. CVPC-2015-2841. Failure to comply with any portion of Idaho Criminal Rule 32 may be
deemed a contempt of court and may be subject to appropriate sanctions.
IT IS SO ORDER¥J2.
DATED this 8,~-day of March 2015.

CHERIC. C O P ~
District Judge

~

ORDER RELEASING PSI

000039

e
:-_-:-_-.:_-_-_"ff.ji_,t"E~.t::--z".""~-~--APR O6 2015
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By TENILLE RAD
DEPUTY

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Shawna Dunn
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
__________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV PC 2015 02841
MOTION FOR WAIVER OF
ATTORNEY/CLIENT
PRIVILEGE

COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County

of Ada, State of Idaho, and moves this Court for its Order waiving the attorney/client
privilege for the following reason:
Petitioner JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM claims, inter alia, that his attorney Brian
Neville provided ineffective assistance of counsel. The State cannot explore this issue
without access to information which is subject to the attorney/client privilege.

See

Evidence Rules 502 and 513. The State therefore asks this Court to find that Petitioner
has waived the attorney/client privilege for purposes of these proceedings, as to all
MOTION FOR WAIVER OF ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE (LEYTHAM), Page 1
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..
information held by Brian Neville which is relevant, or which may lead to evidence
relevant to Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.

-cc--,

DATED this _1i day of April, 2015.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

By:

Shawna Dunn
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

f,./A-

day of April, 2015, I caused to be

served, a true and correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Waiver of Attorney/Client
Privilege upon the individual(s) named below in the manner noted:
Name and address: Lance Fuisting, Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St.
Rom 1107, Boise, Idaho 83702

a

By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first
class.

f

By depositing copies ofthe same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

a

By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for
pickup at the Office ofthe Ada County Prosecutor.

a By faxing copies ofthe same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _ _ __

MOTION FOR WAIVER OF ATTORNEY/CLIENT PRIVILEGE (LEYTHAM), Page 2
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Shawna Dunn
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

CHRISTOPHER

DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
_______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841
ORDER FOR WAIVER OF
ATTORNEY/CLIENT
PRIVILEGE

The Court having heard the motion heretofore made in the above proceedings of JIMMY
DALE LEYTHAM vs. The State ofldaho, by Jan M. Bennetts, Ada County Prosecuting Attorney,
and the Court being fully advised in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the attorney/client privilege is waived, as to all
information held by Brian Neville concerning Petitioner's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
only.

--<---t
DATED this

j_r.J.ay of April, 2015.

District Judge

v
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Courtroom508

Time
Speaker
Note
2:45:25 PM i.
2:45:25 PM !Judge
!calls LEYTHAM v STATE OF IDAHO
CV PC 15 02841
STATUS CONFERENCE
Not Transported
2:59:48 PM lcounsel [Fuisting/Dunn present, pltiff not present
!addresses counsel
3:00:14 PM JJudge
3:00:26 PM jstate
!addresses court on filings on due dates for responses, Mr. Fuisting will
!Attorney iask for a stay on pc
[reviews files
3:01:15 PM {Judge
3:01 :29 PM !Defense !have not file an amended, but asking stay, mtn on the psi, asking stay
!Attorney !to file an amended, asking for transcripts, other matter he was sent
!
!12/24/14 can file a Rule 35 motion, ask the court to appoint counsel
I
ion criminal
!inquire on pd
3:02:49 PM !Judge
3:02:55 PM Jstate
fno obj to appt
!Attorney 1

!

!

J

J

....3: 03:04 ..PM Judge ............ inquires__ appl ..on.. indi ~",...t'l'. . .1........................................................................................................................................
3:03:17 PM (Defense /addresses court
!Attorney
.....................................................................................................................................................................................................................................
.....................................
3:03:23
PM
jJudge
jwill
grant,
but
he
needs
to
file
an
affidavit
of,
t" 01 ~tf\tu
.................................................;.....................................;...................................................................................................................................................................:1.............~l................................................
3:04:06 PM !Judge
iwill take count the motion and affidavit for partial payment
3:04:20 PM }Judge
fwill find tl\.d, 1t+'\-'t to appoint counsel on the underlying criminal case
t
ialso
fno obj to stay, but obj to amended petition
3:04:56 PM 1state
!Attorney l
3:05:09 PM !Judge
jinquies/
3:05:23 PM \Defense \response
\Attorney !
3:05:38 PM lJudge
[will stay on the cv-pc- case, set for status
!inquires on transcripts
3:06:24 PM lJudge
3:06:30 PM !Defense !comments
!Attorney
3:06:35 PM JJudge
[Review date 5/27@3 pm another review.

l

I

'

:

................................................, ..................................... 0, ..................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... .

.........................................................a.,.,,.......................;...................................................................................................................................................................................................................................... .

!

4/15/2015

1 of 1

000043

·~,
\".~~

:!'

•

e

\

Cy'.'l --1._Cj ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER

MAY 2 6 '"!s"',r-·-- .J

Attorneys for Defendant

CHRIGTOPHER o.

LANCE FUISTING ISB#7791
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7 409

By HALEY I\PY~:1\;;
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JIMMY D LEYTHAM,

Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO
CONDUCT DEPOSITION OF COUNSEL,
BRIAN NEVILLE AND BRIAN BLENDER

Respondent.

COMES NOW, JIMMY D LEYTHAM, the above-named Petitioner, by and

through counsel, LANCE FUISTING, of the Ada County Public Defender's Office, and
moves this Court pursuant to Idaho Criminal Rule 57(b), for permission to conduct a
deposition of counsel, Mr. Brian Neville and Mr. Brian Blender. In the original Petition for
Post-Conviction Relief and accompanying First Affidavit of Petitioner, Petitioner alleges
several claims of ineffective assistance of counsel which require further investigation
outside the record. In order to protect Petitioners' rights to the effective assistance of
counsel and to a full and fair hearing on his claims, this Court should permit him to
conduct a deposition of Mr. Neville and Mr. Blender.
A petitioner may employ any method of discovery available under the civil rules,
including depositions. I.R.C.P. 26(a). Depositions may extend beyond those conducted
of trial counsel and their team, including other important witnesses to the petitioner's
claims, such as key law enforcement officers. See, e.g., Rhoades v. State, 135 Idaho

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT DEPOSITION
OF COUNSEL, BRIAN NEVILLE AND BRIAN BLENDER
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•
299, 302 (2000) (noting post-conviction depositions taken of trial counsel and police
officer regarding alleged Miranda violation). A transcript from the deposition will be
attached to Mr. Leytham's Final Amended Petition for Post-Conviction Relief, pursuant
to I.C. § 19-4903 ("Affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations shall
be attached to the application ... "). After reviewing the deposition, this Court will be in
an informed position to decide whether Mr. Leytham's claims should proceed to an
evidentiary hearing or be summarily dismissed. I.C. § 19-4906(c) (authorizing summary
disposition "when it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories,
and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits" that there is no
genuine issue of material fact).
A deposition is necessary to provide additional evidentiary support for Mr.
Leytham's claims. To prove a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Mr. Leytham
must show both that his counsels' performance was deficient and that such deficient
performance prejudiced his defense. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687
(1984). To prove deficient performance, Mr. Leytham "must show that counsel's
representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness." Id. at 688. To do so,
Mr. Leytham must "reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's challenged conduct" for
an objective evaluation of counsel's performance at that time. Id. at 689. Mr. Leytham
"must overcome the presumption that, under the circumstances, the challenged action
'might be considered sound trial strategy."' Id. Accordingly, a deposition should be
granted to afford Mr. Leytham a full and fair opportunity to meet his burden of proof. A
complete understanding of the scope of the investigation and preparation of trial
counsel is necessary to assess trial counsel's performance. See, e.g., Wiggins v. Smith,
539 U.S. 510, 522-23 (2003)(when assessing trial counsel's choices, courts should first
focus on whether the investigation is itself reasonable); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 69091 ("counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary.").
A deposition is the only pre-evidentiary hearing mechanism for fully and fairly
developing Petitioner's claims. Unlike affidavits or other discovery methods, depositions
provide both parties a full opportunity to reconstruct the circumstances of counsel's

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT DEPOSITION
OF COUNSEL, BRIAN NEVILLE AND BRIAN BLENDER
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challenged conduct. As noted by the United States District Court for the Southern
District of New York:
[D]epositions are preferable if a searching interrogation of the other party
is desired. At a deposition the examining party has great flexibility and can
frame the questions on the basis of answers to previous questions.
Moreover, the party being examined does not have the opportunity to
study the questions in advance and to consult with counsel before
answering, as is the case if interrogatories are used. Attempts at evasion,
which might be stymied by a persistent oral examination, cannot easily be
countered by interrogatories. The flexibility and the potency of oral
depositions is in large part lacking in written interrogatories.
Madanes v. Madanes, 199 F.R.D. 135, 142 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) (citation omitted);
see also Russell v. Acme-Evans Co., 51 F.3d 64, 68 (7th Cir.1995) (holding that it is

proper under most circumstances to disregard an affidavit when the affidavit is
contradicted by the witness's prior deposition testimony).
Recently, the Idaho Supreme Court considered whether a trial court's refusal to
permit a post-conviction deposition of trial counsels' investigator constituted an abuse of
discretion. Hall, 151 Idaho at 52. The Court did not set forth specific criteria for
analyzing the propriety of deposing a defense investigator but instead relied upon the
three-pronged abuse of discretion standard to determine whether the district court
properly denied the deposition of the investigator. Id. at 51. The Court noted the
investigator was cooperative with post-conviction counsel (although he would not sign
an affidavit), and post-conviction counsel were able to depose trial counsel, thus
providing petitioner with a means of obtaining evidence to support his claim that counsel
were ineffective for failing to investigate and present evidence of an alternate
perpetrator. Id. at 52. The Court also observed that trial counsels' depositions were the
most direct and material evidence of the investigation into the alternate perpetrator they
had authorized, the results of that investigation, and how that information was used. Id.
All of Mr. Leytham's claims require further investigation in order to determine what
factual basis exists for them. Mr. Leytham's present counsel needs to ask questions
related to his claims of ineffectiv~ assistance in order to provide the required evidence
to earn an evidentiary hearing on such claims. Post-Conviction counsel seeks to inquire
of Mr. Neville and Mr. Blender as follows:

MOTION FOR PERMISSION TO CONDUCT DEPOSITION
OF COUNSEL, BRIAN NEVILLE AND BRIAN BLENDER
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I.

Claim One: Mr. Leytham claims that Mr. Neville failed to conduct a proper pre-

trial investigation. Post-Conviction counsel intends to inquire of Mr. Neville
regarding his investigation of issues related to Mr. Leytham's case.
II. Claim Two: Mr. Reed claims that Mr. Neville (and Mr. Blender, who covered the
Change of Plea hearing) failed to investigate and discuss strategy prior to the
entry of a guilty plea. Post-Conviction counsel intends to inquire of both Mr.
Neville and Mr. Blender about the facts surrounding the guilty plea and
whether there were deficiencies in the representation.
Ill. Claim Three: Mr. Reed claims that Mr. Neville failed to communicate effectively
with him. Post-Conviction Counsel intends to inquire of Mr. Neville about the
extent and nature of communications he had with Mr. Leytham.

DATED this

Attorney for Petitioner

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

Zc- day of May 2015, I mailed (served) a

true and correct copy of the within instrument to:
Shawna Dunn
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Interdepartmental Mail

r
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!Present: Lance Fuisting for petitioner, Shawna Dunn for respondent
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3:20:08 PM iCourt
!Petitioner has filed a motion for permission to conduct deposition of
!
itrial counsel.
...............,...-............................;..........................-.......................................................................................................................................
................... ............._,,....... _________................ .....
3:20:57 PM !Fuisting
!That motion was only just filed yesterday. Updates Court on case
!
!status since last hearing. Ask that the motion be set for hearing.

-
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-

_.
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3:23:08 PM jDunn
3:23:39 PM !Court
3:24:36 PM l

WH be filing my Response today or tomorrow.

!6/17/15 @4pm for hearing on the motion .
!End of case
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JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

Shawna Dunn
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
ISB No. 5287
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841
OBJECTION TO DEPOSITIONS

COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of

Ada, State of Idaho, in the above entitled matter, and object to the petitioner's request to hold
depositions in this case.
LEGAL STANDARD

The Supreme Court recently spoke to the issue of post-conviction discovery, saying:
A district court has discretion to grant discovery in post-conviction proceedings.
I.C.R. 57(b); Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 45, 253 P.3d 716, 719 (2011). However,
discovery is required when a petitioner demonstrates it is necessary to protect his
substantial rights. Hall, 151 Idaho at 45, 253 P.3d at 719. The petitioner "must
identify the specific subject matter where discovery is requested and why discovery
as to those matters is necessary to his or her application." Id. (quoting State v.

1
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e
LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 810, 69 P.3d 1064, 1071 (Ct. App. 2003)). While
reasonable discovery may be permitted, the district court should not allow the
petitioner to engage in a "[f]ishing expedition." Murphy v. State, 143 Idaho 139, 148,
139 P.3d 741, 750 (Ct. App. 2006). "The UPCPA provides a forum for known
grievances, not an opportunity to research for
grievances."
Id.
State v. Abdullah, 2015 Ida. LEXIS 78, *244-245 (Idaho Mar. 2, 2015).
ANALYSIS
As explained in the Abdullah decision, for discovery to be required, the petitioner must
show that it is necessary to protect substantial rights. Id. The State submits that the petitioner
cannot make such a showing. The presentence report along with transcripts of the plea hearing and
sentencing hearing defeat the petitioner arguments without the need for depositions or an
evidentiary hearing
First, the petitioner claims that the deposition would include inquiry into whether Mr.
Neville conducted proper pretrial investigation. There is no specificity to the allegation that more
investigation should have been done. The petitioner has not alleged what such investigation would
have revealed or why that revelation would have been helpful in the case.

The plea hearing

transcript clearly reflects that this area was the subject of close scrutiny by the Court. Specifically,
the Court inquired,
Q: Have you reviewed the evidence that was provided to your attorney
provided [sic] during discovery?
A: Yes, I have.
Q: ls there anything that your attorney has -that you've asked your attorney
to do that he has not done?
A: No, ma' am.
Q: And have you told your attorney everything that you know about these
crimes?
A: Yes, ma'am
Q: Have you had enough time to talk to your attorney?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Are there witnesses who can demonstrate you are innocent of this crime?

OBJECTION TO DEPOSITIONS (LEYTHAM) Page 2
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A:No,ma'am.
(Tr., pg. 24, ln.17 to pg. 25, ln.14.)
This passage, along with the rest of the record, reflects that additional inquiry by defense
counsel would have been to no avail. Mr. Leytham agreed he had seen the discovery. Mr. Leytham
admitted, during his entry of plea, there was nothing he had asked of counsel that had not been done
and further admitted there were no witnesses who could demonstrate his innocence. (Tr., pg. 24,
ln.17 to pg. 25, ln.14.). More importantly, he also admitted the he had committed the crimes of
Forgery and Criminal Possession of a Financial Transaction Card and entered guilty pleas to the
same. (Tr., pg. 30, ln.11 to pg. 32, ln. 6.) The State's discovery is in the presentence report and is
lengthy. Additionally, the purse theft was on video, which was provided to Mr. Leytham and his
attorney in discovery. (Tr., pg. 42, ln.17 - pg. 43, ln.2.) Similarly, there were still photos of Mr.
Leytham as he ttied to access cash with the victim's card. (Tr., pg. 58, ln.22 to pg. 59, ln. 1) Given
all of the above, there has not been a sufficient showing that a deposition in this area would even be
productive, let alone necessary.
Next, the petitioner claims that counsel was ineffective in regard to advising him to enter a
guilty plea. Counsel Insofar as the evidence against Mr. Leytham was significant on each count, it
was not ineffective to advise the petitioner to enter a plea pursuant to a negotiated plea agreement.
Advising a client to enter a guilty plea is a tactical decision. The petitioner has not shown counsel's
choice of tactics was "was unsound or that it resulted from any shortcomings in counsel's
knowledge or preparation." Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 160, 857 P.2d 634, 639 (Ct. App. 1993)
Further the petitioner has not forwarded any reason to believe depositions would reveal helpful
information in this area.
Specifically, the petitioner alleges that counsel failed to adequately advise him of trial
strategy. Where the petitioner entered a guilty plea prior to trial, the State cannot perceive how
failing to advise of trial strategy could be deemed ineffective assistance of counsel. Mr Leytham
was guilty as charged and admitted the conduct short of trial. Counsel made a tactical decision to
pursue a negotiated plea, based on a thorough understanding of the facts and after consultation with
his client.

/

The petitioner further claims that he was assured he would get probation. This is belied by
the record. The petitioner was present when the Court inquired of the State whether the State was
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free to argue for imposition, saying, "you can argue for imposition[?]" (Tr., pg. 6, Ins. 13-15.) To
which the State replied, "Yes, Your Honor." (Tr., pg. 6, Ins. 15.) The Court went to clarify that the
plea was not binding. The following exchange then occurred:
Q:What that means is that I can actually give you a 14-year prison sentence
in the forgery case and a five-year prison sentence in the financial transaction
card case and I can run them consecutive to each other for a total of 19years
without the possibility of parole. Do you understand that?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And I'm not required to follow recommendations of either counsel. Do
you understand that?
A: Yes ma'am.
(Tr., pg. 23, Ins. 3-14.)
Further even if counsel had not made this clear, the State submits that such a failure could be
corrected on the record. Recent appellate court cases in this regard are significant: Murray v. State,
156 Idaho 159, 321 P.3d 709 (2014) and Grant v. State,_ Idaho_, 329 P.3d 380 (Ct. App.
2014).

These cases, together, indicate that ineffective assistance of counsel, in the form of

inadequate information prior to a guilty plea, can be cured when the criminal defendant is fully
advised by the Court. Here, Mr. Leytham's exchange with the Court cures any argument that he
was not fully advised by counsel. Moreover, when asked by the Court he indicates that he does
understand the limitations of the deal - which demonstrates that he had already been informed by
counsel.
Finally,

the petitioner claims that there was a breakdown of attorney-client.

communications. The Ninth Circuit has said that, "[t]he Supreme Court has held that a criminal
defendant has a constitutional right to counsel who is free of conflicts of interest. It also has held
that a defendant does not have a constitutional right to an appointed lawyer with whom he has a
'meaningful relationship' so long as the lawyer acts as the client's advocate." Plumlee v. Masto,
512 F.3d 1211 (9th Cir. 2008). The Ninth Circuit has recently addressed the same issue, saying:
Obviously, the word "conflict" is also used in common parlance to describe
a personality conflict, an artistic conflict, a family conflict and many others
sorts of antagonism - even war. In this context, however, as the Supreme
Court cases make clear, we are talking about legal conflicts of interest - an
incompatibility between the interests of the two of a lawyer's clients, or
between the lawyer's own private interest and those of his client.
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Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2008) No actual conflict of interest existed in this
case and the "quality" of petitioner's relationship with his counsel does not rise to the level of
meriting a remedy or further inquiry. At this point, he has, at most, claimed that Mr. Neville had a
positive social relationship with the trial Judge. 1 Even if true, this would have been to the
petitioner's benefit. Accordingly, further inquiry in this area is not merited. Counsel continued to
serve Mr. Leytham's interests and argued on his behalf at sentencing. There has been no showing
that further inquiry is necessary to protect Mr. Leytham's substantial rights.
CONCLUSION
Based on the foregoing, the State moves that the Court deny the motion for depositions.
Further, if the Court is not inclined to grant the State's motion, the State seeks oral argument.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this i)j_ day of May, 2015.

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecutor

~S)AJuvrShawnaDunn
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney

1 The

State does not concede the accuracy of this point, but will treat it as true merely for the
purposes or our briefing.

5
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this

..zi_ day of May, 2015, a true and correct copy of the

foregoing Objection to Depositions was served to: in the manner noted below:
Jimmy D. Leytham, IDOC No. 16742, ISCI Unit 10, PO Box 14, Boise, Idaho 83707
CJ

By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first
class.

CJ

By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.

CJ

By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the
Office of the Ada County Prosecutor.

CJ

By faxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at the facsimile number: _ _ __

1_~

..__,?

Legal Assistant

6
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT~~v
1

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

2
3

4

JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,

5

6

Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841

Petitioner,
vs.

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
DISCOVERY

7

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
8

Respondent.
9

10

On February 25, 2015, Jimmy Leytham, filed a Petition pro se 1 and requested the Court

11

appoint counsel. The Court granted his request that same date. The Court held a status conference,

12

and at the petitioner's request, continued the status conference to allow him to file a Rule 35. At
the continued hearing, his counsel requested more time and the Court rescheduled the status

13
14
15
16

conference again to June 17, 2015.
Leytham moved for discovery, more specifically allowing him to take depositions of his
trial counsel.
Based on the following, the Court denies his motion.
ANALYSIS

17

The Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure generally apply to proceedings on an application for
18

post-conviction relief, the discovery provisions contained in those rules are not applicable unless
19

specifically ordered by the court. I.C.R. 57(b); State v. LePage, 138 Idaho 803, 810, 69 P.3d 1064,

20

1071 (Ct. App. 2003) (citing Aeschliman v. State, 132 Idaho 397,402,973 P.2d 749, 754 (Ct. App.

21

1999)). I.C.R. 57(b) provides as follows:

22

23
24
25

1 "Prose litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." Twin Falls Cnty. v.
Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445, 80 P.3d I 043, I 046 (2003). Pro se litigants are not accorded any special consideration
simply because they are representing themselves and are not excused from adhering to procedural rules. Nelson v.
Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 170 P.3d 375, 383 (2007); Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342, 346, 941 P.2d 314, 318
(1997); Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 392, 797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990), quoting Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, I 12
Idaho 1086, 1089 n.5, 739 P.2d 385,388 n.5 (1987).

26

ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR DISCOVERY
I
CASE NO. CV-PC-2015-2841

000055

1
2
3

4

(b) Filing and Processing. The petition for post-conviction relief shall be
filed by the clerk of the court as a separate civil case and be processed under the
Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure except as otherwise ordered by the trial court;
provided the provisions for discovery in the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure shall
not apply to the proceedings unless and only to the extent ordered by the trial court.
I.C.R. 57(b) (emphasis added).
Discovery during post-conviction relief proceedings is a matter put to the sound discretion

5

of the district court. Aeschliman, 132 Idaho at 402, 973 P.2d at 754. Unless necessary to protect

6

Leytham's substantial rights, the Court is not required to order discovery. Id. In order to be granted

7

discovery, a post-conviction applicant must identify the specific subject matter where discovery is

8

requested and why discovery as to those matters is necessary to his application. See Id. at 402-03,

9

973 P.2d at 754-55. In this request, Leytham is really engaging in nothing but a fishing expedition.
While he cites to Hall v. State, 151 Idaho 42, 52,253 P.3d 716, 726 (2011), that was a capital case

10

and does not really apply. In addition, the Supreme Court upheld the District Court's exercise of
11

12

discretion in denying some additional depositions of investigaotrs.
In this Petition, he contends as follows:
•

13

His attorneys were ineffective for:
o Failing to investigate

14

o Failing to effectively communicate

15

These are routine matters. Other than cursory claims that he wants to inquire regarding
16

investigation of his issues, the Court finds Leytham made no showing why the discovery he

17

requests is necessary to his application. Leytham's claims are abstract. Raudebaugh v. State, 135

18

Idaho 602, 605, 21 P.3d 924, 927 (2001). Therefore, in an exercise of discretion, the Court denies

19

motion.

20

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 6th day of June 2015.
21
22

CheriC~Di~

23

24
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1

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
2
3

The undersigned authority hereby certifies that on June

3 , 2015, I mailed (served) a true

4

and correct copy of the ORDER DENYING MOTION as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) 1.C.R. to

5

each of the parties below as follows:

6

7

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
SHAWNA DUNN
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

8
9

10

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE
LANCE FUISTING
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

11

12
13

14
15
16

Date:
17

~(,µs

18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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Note
!JIMMY LEYTHAM CV PC 15 02841 STATUS
fPresent Lance Fusiting for petitioner, Shawna Dunn for respondent

~

4:10:49 PM JFuisting
4:10:56 PM fcourt
4:12:18 PM 1court
4:13:18 PM

Courtroom507

1we can lift the stay now.
Jrhat's correct. And I'd ask for two weeks from today to file a final
!Amended Petition.
fAsk State to provide the order lifting stay. Amended Petition,hor
/notice of not filing one, due by 7/2; State's response by 8/2/15.
!Doesn't sound like we'll need an evidentiary hearing.

1

!

•

·

Jrn be seeking one.
frve looked at the claims and they're fairly straight forward.
1You have until 8/24/15 to file an opposition; if none is filed, then I'll
ltake the matter under advisement.
JEnd of case
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JUN 3 0 2015
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
By TENllLE GRANT
D'.:':PlJTY

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
LANCE L. FOISTING, ISB #7791
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,
Case No. CV-PC-2015-2841
Petitioner,
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,

SECOND AND FINAL AFFIDAVIT OF
JIMMY LEYTHAM IN SUPPORT OF
PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION
RELIEF

Respondent.

I, Jimmy D. Leytham, after first being duly sworn (affirmed), do hereby attest to the
following:
1)

I am over the age of eighteen years.

2)

I was the Defendant in CR-FE-2014-3478 and CR-FE-2014-5259.

3)

I retained Brian Neville as my attorney in those cases.

4)

On the day I plead guilty, September 10, 2014, Brian Blender, who works
with Mr. Neville, appeared to represent me.

5)

I did not know Mr. Blender would be appearing prior to September 10,
2014.

6)

I only had a 7 to 10 minute discussion with Mr. Blender prior to pleading
guilty on September 10, 2014.
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OF PETITION FOR POST CONVICTION RELIEF
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7)

Mr. Blender and I did not discuss restitution on September 10, 2014.

8)

I was taking numerous medications at the time of my change of plea.

9)

I believe the medications I was taking on September 10, 2014, impacted
my ability to understand the proceedings.

10)

I initially informed the Court that the drugs I was on made me more
susceptible to suggestions from Mr. Blender during my change of plea on
September 10, 2014.

11)

I did not fill out the entire written guilty plea myself.

12)

I told Mr. Neville about my medical conditions.

13)

Mr. Neville did not attempt to obtain my medical records.

14)

There was no proof of my medical conditions to supply to the Court at the
time of my sentencing.

15)

Neither Mr. Neville or Mr. Blender explained to me that I had a right not
to participate in the presentence investigation process.

16)

There was no discussion of the restitution amount during my change of
plea hearing.

17)

At sentencing, my attorney agreed to $55,331.92 in restitution for
uncharged conduct on my behalf. I was never asked if I agreed to that
amount.

18)

I believed the restitution was $202.75.
presentence report.

19)

My attorney did not show me the presentence report until the day of
sentencing.

20)

My attorney only showed me Dr. Arnold's evaluation on the day of
sentencing.

21)

I was unable to read the presentence report and evaluation myself because
of a medical condition.

22)

I do not believe my attorney read me Dr. Arnold's evaluation in its
entirety.

23)

I do not believe my attorney thoroughly reviewed the presentence report
and evaluations with me.

24)

My attorney only read the recommendations section of the presentence
report to me.

25)

I was advised not to say anything when I had my opportunity to address
the Court at sentencing.

26)

Neither Mr. Neville nor Mr. Blender spoke to me about my right to appeal
my sentence.

That was the amount in the
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27)

No appeal of my sentence was filed.

28)

Further your affiant sayeth naught.

DATED, this

30

day of June 2015.

SUBSCRIBED and SWORN (AFFIRMED) to before me, a Notary Public, in and for
the state of Idaho, county of Ada, this

Jo;'}µay of _l~~-1)~-C....~------ 20-15_.

Notary Public
Residing at

'A,p(,//f. Co1.viH

My Commission Expires

<j,/JD/{;

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this t:-0

day of June 2015, I mailed (served) a true and

correct copy of the within instrument to:

Shawna Dunn
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

3
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•
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

JUL os 2ms

Shawna Dunn
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
ISB No. 5287
200 W. Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Phone: 287-7700
Fax: 287-7709

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, C1c
By BETH MASTERS
DEPUTY

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM,
Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841
ORDER LIFTING STAY OF
PROCEEDINGS

The above matter coming before the Court on the 17th day of June 2015, the Petitioner
being before the Court represented by counsel, the Court having considered arguments of counsel
and being otherwise advised in the matter;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED AND THIS COURT DOES ORDER that Order Granting

Stay of Proceedings is lifted. The Petitioner is to file any amended petition on or before July 2,
2015.

~
DATED this.!_ day of July, 2015.

1
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JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

8y JAMIE MAFITIN I
DEPUTY

Shawna Dunn
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 5287
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM,
Petitioner,
vs.

THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

_______________

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Case No. CV PC 2015 02841
ANSWER TO PETITION FOR
POST CONVICTION RELIEF

COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of
Ada, State of Idaho, and does hereby Answer Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief in
the above-entitled action as follows:

I.
GENERAL RESPONSES TO PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS

All allegations made by the Petitioner are denied by the State unless specifically admitted
herein.
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IL
SPECIFIC ANSWERS TO PETITIONER'S POST-CONVICTION ALLEGATIONS

1.

Answering paragraphs 1 and 2 of Petitioner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief

filed February 25, 2015 as CV PC 2015 02841, Respondent admits the allegations contained
therein.
2.

Answering paragraph 3, the Respondent admits in part and denies in part. The

Petitioner was sentenced on case CR-FE-2014-0003478 as the Petitioner alleges. However, the
Petitioner was also sentenced in CR-FE-2014-0005269
3.

Answering paragraph 4, Respondent admits the allegations contained therein.

4.

Answering paragraph 5, the Respondent admits in part and denies in part. As

alleged in paragraph 5, the Petitioner entered a guilty plea to Count II. However it was Counts I
and III that were dismissed, not I and II as the Petitioner alleges.
5.

Answering paragraph 6, the Respondent has insufficient information to either

admit or deny that a timely appeal was filed because the Ada County Prosecutor's Office does
not generally handle appellate matters for the State. However, the State would note that the only
appeal on the register of actions currently is an appeal from the denial of a Rule 35. If there was
a timely appeal, from the judgement of conviction it is not recorded on the register of actions
reviewed by the Respondent.
6.

Answering paragraphs 7 and 8 regarding, the Petitioner's statement of his requests

these are not factual allegations capable of being admitted or denied.
7. Answering paragraph 9, the Respondent denies that representation by counsel in this
case was ineffective and further denies that any prejudice attached from any alleged
ineffectiveness.
5.

Answering paragraph 10 and 11 are not factual allegations capable of being

admitted or denied
FIRST AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitioner's petition fails to state any grounds upon which relief can be granted. Idaho
Code§ 19-4901(a); I.R.C.P. 12(b)(6).
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SECOND AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
To the extent Petitioner's claims should have been raised on direct appeal, the claims are
procedurally defaulted. Idaho Code§ 19-4901(b).

THIRD AFFIRMATIVE DEFENSE
Petitoner's Petition for Post-Conviction Relief contains bare and conclusory allegations
unsubstantiated by affidavits, records, or other admissible evidence, and therefore fails to raise a
genuine issue of material fact. Idaho Code§§ 19-4902(a), 19-4903, and 19-4906.

WHEREFORE, Respondent prays for relief as follows:

a)

That the Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be denied;

b)

That the Petitioner's claims for post-conviction relief be dismissed;

c)

for such other and further relief as the court deems necessary in the case.
~

DATED this;)] day of July 2015.

JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

~~
By: Shawna Dunn
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on thisdQday of July 2015, I caused to be served, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Answer to Petition for Post Conviction Relief upon the individuals
named below in the manner noted:
Name and address: Lance Fuisting, Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St. Room 1107,
Boise, Idaho 83702
o

By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.

rp( By depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o

By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the office
of the Ada County Prosecutor.

o

By faxing copies of the same to said attorney(s) at the facsimile number: _ __

~
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JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney
Shawna Dunn
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
Idaho State Bar No. 4606
200 West Front Street, Room 3191
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7700

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JIMMY DALE LEYTHAM,

)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)
)

Petitioner,
vs.
THE STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

Case No. CV PC 2015 02841
MOTION FOR SUMMARY
DISMISSAL

COMES NOW, Shawna Dunn, Deputy Prosecuting Attorney, in and for the County of

Ada, State of Idaho, and does hereby moves for summary dismissal of the Petitioner's Petition
for Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to I.C. § 19-4906(c) on the general basis that, in light of the
pleadings, answers, admissions, and the record of the underlying criminal case, the petition fails
to raise a genuine issue of material fact.

I.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

The post-conviction relief process initiates a civil proceeding where, like all civil actions,
the petitioner must prove the allegations by a preponderance of the evidence. Murray v. State,
121 Idaho 918, 921, 828 P.2d 1323, 1326 (Ct. App. 1992); I.C. §19-4907. However, unlike
ordinary civil actions, an application for post-conviction relief:
must contain much more than "a short and plain statement of the claim" that
would suffice for a complaint under I.R.C.P. 8(a)(l). Rather, an application for
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post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal
knowledge of the applicant, and affidavits, records or other evidence supporting
its allegations must be attached, or the application must state why such supporting
evidence is not included with the application. I. C. § 19-4903. In other words, the
application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal.
Knutsen v. State, 144 Idaho 433, 437-38, 163 P.3d 222, 226-27 (Ct. App. 2007). If a petitioner
cannot support allegations in his post-conviction petition with verified facts or admissible evidence,
Idaho Code §19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for post
conviction relief, either pursuant to motion of a party or upon the court's own
initiative. Summary dismissal is permissible only when the applicant's evidence has
raised no genuine issue of material fact which, if resolved in the applicant's favor,
would entitle the applicant to the requested relief. If such a factual issue is presented,
an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. (citation omitted)
Goodwin v. State, 138 Idaho 269, 271-72, 61 P.3d 626, 627 (Ct. App. 2002). Further, the Court
of Appeals explained that:
Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly
disproven by the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not
presented evidence making a prima facie case as to each essential element of the
claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not justify relief as a matter of
law. Citations omitted.
Keserovic v. State, 345 P.3d 1024, 1028-29 (Ct. App. 2015). The Idaho Supreme Court specified
in State v. Lovelace that Courts "do not give evidentiary value to mere conclusory allegations that
are unsupported by admissible evidence." State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 61, 90 P.3d 278, 286
(2003).
II.

ISSUES

In the Petitioner's petition, he identifies three claims for relief based on allegations of
ineffective assistance of counsel. The Court should dismiss the claims for post-conviction relief
because the Petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material
fact as to whether his representation was ineffective. Evidence demonstrates that:
1. Petitioner's counsel fulfilled his duty to investigate;
2. Petitioner's counsel adequately advised him on all matters necessary to enter an informed
guilty plea;
3. The quality of petitioner's relationship with his counsel does not rise to the level of
meriting a remedy;
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To the extent that additional facts raised in the Petitioner's Second Affidavit could be
construed as additional claims for relief, those possible claims are without merit because:
4. Petitioner was informed of his rights and responsibilities under the plea deal prior to entry
of plea.
5. None of the Petitioner's medications impaired his ability to enter an informed guilty plea.

III.

ANALYSIS

The Court should grant the State's Motion for Summary Judgment as the Petitioner has
raised no genuine issues of material fact to support his claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel. To determine whether a defendant received ineffective assistance of counsel, Idaho uses
the two-prong Strickland test. Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d 709, 714 (2014).
Under Strickland, a defendant must show: (1) that counsel's representation was deficient and (2)
that the deficiency prejudiced the defendant's case. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687,
687, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2064 (1984). To prove deficient representation, Petitioner must show that
his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. To
demonstrate prejudice, Petitioner must how a reasonable probability that "but for counsel's
unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different." Id at 694,
Strickland v. Washington, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2068 (1984). Under the Strickland standard,
counsel is "strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made all significant
decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment." Id at 690, 104 S. Ct. at 2066.
None of the Petitioners' explicit or implicit claims overcome the strong presumption that
his counsel rendered adequate assistance. His claims of ineffective assistance of counsel are not
supported by admissible evidence. Instead, his claims are undermined by the record and his
written guilty plea. Because petitioner cannot make the requisite showing that he was prejudiced
by any alleged deficiency in representation, this Court should summarily dismiss without an
evidentiary hearing.
1. The Court should enter summary judgment dismissing Petitioner's First Claim because

Petitioner's counsel fulfilled his duty to investigate.

There is no merit to the Petitioner's first claim to ineffective assistance of counsel, where
he asserts that his attorney failed to conduct investigation as required by the Sixth Amendment.
The United States Supreme Court describes defense counsel's Sixth Amendment duty to
investigate as "a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable decision that
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makes particular investigations unnecessary." Strickland at 691, 104 S. Ct. at 2066 .The duty to
investigate is not boundless, but is limited in scope. Id at 680-81, 104 S. Ct. at 2061. When
evaluating whether assistance of counsel was effective, "a particular decision not to
investigate must be directly assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances, applying a
heavy measure of deference to counsel's judgments." Id at 691, 104 S.Ct. at 2066.
Considering the circumstances, including the strength of the State's cases, the record
reveals that additional investigation by defense counsel would have been to no avail 1• The Court
explored the adequacy of the investigation during the plea hearing, inquiring,
Q: Have you reviewed the evidence that was provided to your attorney provided
[sic] during discovery?
A: Yes, I have.
Q: Is there anything that your attorney has - that you've asked your attorney to do
that he has not done?
A: No, ma'am.
Q: And have you told your attorney everything that you know about these crimes?
A: Yes, ma'am
Q: Have you had enough time to talk to your attorney?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: Are there witnesses who can demonstrate you are innocent of this crime?
A: No, ma'am.
(Tr., pg. 24, ln.17 to pg. 25, ln.8.)
Petitioner agreed he had seen the discovery. Petitioner admitted, during his entry of plea
there was nothing he had asked of counsel that had not been done and further admitted there
were no witnesses who could demonstrate his innocence. (Tr., pg. 24, ln.17 to pg. 25, ln.14).
The purse theft was on video, which was provided to the Petitioner and his attorney in discovery.
(Tr., pg. 42, ln.17 to pg. 43, ln.2). Similarly, there were still photos of the Petitioner as he tried
to access cash with the victim's card. (Tr., pg. 58, ln.22 to pg. 59, ln. l ). Additionally, the State's
discovery is lengthy, as demonstrated by the presentence report. The Petitioner's petition does
not specifically allege what more investigation should have been done, what such investigation
would have revealed, or how he was prejudiced by lack of investigation. Because petitioner has
failed to show the requisite prejudice to establish an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the
Court should enter summary judgment dismissing the claim.

1 The

State will discuss the facts of Mr. Leytham's cases together, however the Petitioner is technically only pursuing
post conviction relief in case number CR-FE-2014-0003478.
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2. The Court should enter summary judgment dismissing petitioner's second claim
because Petitioner's counsel adequately advised him on all matters necessary to enter
an informed guilty plea.
Because the Petitioner was appropriately advised before entry of plea, the Court should enter
summary judgment dismissing the petitioner's second claim. Specifically, the Court should
dismiss petitioner's claim that he was not advised on trial strategy and that he was promised
probation because these allegations are without merit.
Idaho Courts apply the Strickland test to determine whether a defendant received
effective assistance of counsel during plea negotiations. Murray, 156 Idaho at 164, 321 P.3d at
714. When alleging ineffective counsel during the plea process, a Petitioner must demonstrate
"there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty
and would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671, 676, 227 P.3d 925,
930 (2010). Put another way, demonstrating ineffective assistance during the plea process,
requires a showing that a decision not to accept a plea agreement and plead guilty
would have been rational under the circumstances. A bare assertion that one
would not have pied guilty and would have insisted on going to trial is insufficient
to prevent summary dismissal. See Ridgley, id. at 677, 227 P.3d at 931. Instead, a
petitioner must link his claim of deficient performance to his decision to plead
guilty and demonstrate why the deficiency caused the guilty plea. Id.
Evans v. State, Docket No. Docket No. 40300, 2014 Unpublished Opinion No. 411, 2014 Ida.
App. Unpub. LEXIS 113, at *12 (Idaho Ct. App. Mar. 11, 2014).
Where the evidence against the Petitioner was significant on each count, it was not
ineffective to advise the Petitioner to enter a plea under a negotiated plea agreement. By going to
trial, the Petitioner would have risked a guilty verdict on three counts of Felony Forgery in CRFE-2014-0003478. In electing to go to trial in CR-FE-2014-0005269, the Petitioner would have
risked convictions of a Felony Grand Theft and Felony Possession of a Financial Transaction
Card. Additionally, the Petitioner could have been charged as a persistent offender. By
negotiating a deal where Petitioner pleaded guilty to only two felonies, counsel ensured that his
client would not be convicted of three additional felony charges or treated as a persistent
offender at sentencing. The Petitioner cannot demonstrate a reasonable probability that, but for
counsel's deficient performance, he would not have pleaded guilty and would have insisted on
going to trial. Consequently, the Court should enter summary judgment dismissing the claim.
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The Court should dismiss Petitioner's ineffective assistance claim under summary
judgment because petitioner failed to demonstrate why any deficiency in counsel's advice caused
him to plead guilty. Petitioner makes the bare assertion that counsel failed to adequately advise
him of trial strategy, such lack of advice is not prejudicial. See, e.g., Jones v. State, 125 Idaho
294, 296-97, 870 P.2d 1, 3-4 (Ct. App. 1994) (summary dismissal of ineffective counsel claim
appropriate where petitioner alleged attorney had not informed petitioner about the trial process
but did not also articulate any prejudicial effect from this lack of information). Here, Petitioner
has not articulated what prejudicial impact resulted from ignorance of trial strategy, and has not
met his burden of showing "that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have pleaded guilty and
would have insisted on going to trial." Ridgley, 148 Idaho at 676, 227 P.3d at 930. Because the
Petitioner's allegations do not entitle him to relief as a matter of law, his claim must be
dismissed.
Furthermore, the Court should enter summary judgment dismissing the Petitioner's
second claim because the record shows that the Petitioner pleaded guilty knowing that the Court
was not bound by counsel's sentencing recommendations. Petitioner claims he pleaded guilty
because counsel assured Petitioner he would receive probation; however, the record
demonstrates that Petitioner pleaded guilty knowing that probation was not guaranteed. The
Petitioner was present when the Court inquired of the State whether the State could argue for
imposition, saying, "you can argue for imposition[?]" (Tr., pg. 6, lns. 13-15.) To which the
State replied, "Yes, Your Honor." (Tr., pg. 6, ln. 15.) The Court went to clarify that the plea
was not binding. The following exchange occurred:
Q: What that means is that I can actually give you a 14-year prison sentence in the
forgery case and a five-year prison sentence in the financial transaction card case
and I can run them consecutive to each other for a total of 19 years without the
possibility of parole. Do you understand that?
A: Yes, ma'am.
Q: And I'm not required to follow recommendations of either counsel. Do you
understand that?
A: Yes ma'am.
(Tr., pg. 23, lns. 3-14). Clearly Petitioner knew that it was not a binding plea agreement and that
there was the possibility of a prison sentence.
Even if counsel had not clarified that the plea was non-binding, the State submits that
such a failure could be corrected on the record. Recent appellate court cases are significant:
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Murray, 156 Idaho 159, 321 P.3d 709 and Grant v. State, 156 Idaho 598, 605, 329 P.3d 380 (Ct.
App. 2014). These cases together indicate that ineffective assistance of counsel, in inadequate
information prior to a guilty plea, can be cured when the criminal defendant is fully advised by
the Court. Here, Petitioner's exchange with the Court cures any argument that he was not fully
advised by counsel. Moreover, when asked by the Court he indicates that he does understand the
limitations of the deal - which demonstrates that he had already been informed by counsel.
Furthermore, when the petitioner described the plea agreement on his written guilty plea,
petitioner mentioned no promise of probation. (Guilty Plea, pg. 3 § 9).
Consequently, the Petitioner has not proven by a preponderance of the evidence that his
guilty plea was attributable to his counsel's defective performance, or that such performance was
prejudicial. This Court should enter summary judgment dismissing the petitioner's second claim.

3. The Court should enter summary judgment dismissing petitioner's third claim because
the quality of petitioner's relationship with his counsel does not rise to the level of
meriting a remedy.
The Court should enter summary judgment dismissing the Petitioner's third claim
because the quality of attorney-client communications here does not warrant post-conviction
relief. The Petitioner claims there was a breakdown of attorney-client communications.
However, poor communication between lawyer and client, or "a lack of [communication],
without allegations of prejudice, is not enough to sustain an ineffective assistance claim." Jones,
125 Idaho at 297, 870 P.2d at 4.
Here, Petitioner has not shown that any attorney-client communication issues produced a
prejudicial result. In his First Affidavit, Petitioner alleges that his counsel failed to return phone
calls and failed to call petitioner to confirm that a court date had not been rescheduled. While
failing to return a phone call, if true, could be an irritation, such behavior renders no attorney's
performance ineffective. Petitioner also alleged that Mr. Neville did not show up for the plea
hearing on September 10, 2014. However, petitioner concedes that Mr. Blender, another attorney
from the same firm represented Petitioner at the hearing. Petitioner also alleges in his Second
Affidavit that he spoke to Mr. Blender for a limited time prior to pleading guilty on September
10, 2014. However, when asked by the Court, the Petitioner agreed that he had enough time to
speak to his attorney and had told the attorney everything he knew about the crimes. (Tr., pg.24,
ln. 25 to pg. 25, ln.5). As Petitioner is only entitled to relief if he can show alleged errors
produced a prejudicial result, petitioner's claim should be dismissed.
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While an attorney's conflict of interest may warrant post-conviction remedy, no such
conflict of interest occurred in this case. The Idaho Supreme Court reasoned that "until a
defendant shows that his counsel actively represented conflicting interests, he has not established
the constitutional predicate for his claim of ineffective assistance." Lovelace, 140 Idaho at 61, 90
P.3d at 286. The Ninth Circuit has recently addressed the issue, saying:
Obviously, the word "conflict" is also used in common parlance to describe a
personality conflict, an artistic conflict, a family conflict and many others sorts of
antagonism- even war. In this context, however, as the Supreme Court cases make
clear, we are talking about legal conflicts of interest- an incompatibility between the
interests of the two of a lawyer's clients, or between the lawyer's own private
interest and those of his client.
Plumlee v. Masto, 512 F.3d 1204, 1210 (9th Cir. 2008). No actual conflict of interest existed in this
case and the "quality" of Petitioner's relationship with his counsel does not rise to the level of
meriting a remedy. Petitioner has claimed that Mr. Neville had a positive social relationship with
the trial Judge.2 Even if true, this would have been to the petitioner's benefit. Counsel continued to
serve the Petitioner's interests and argued on his behalf at sentencing. Therefore, the Petitioner's
third claim should be dismissed pursuant to summary judgment.

4. The Court should enter summary judgment dismissing any possible claims implied in
the petitioner's affidavits because petitioner was informed of his rights and
responsibilities under the plea deal prior to entry of plea.
To the extent that any additional claims are implied in the petitioner's Affidavits, these
allegations do not entitle the Petitioner to post-conviction relief. Petitioner implies in his
affidavits certain possible issues, namely that: (A) he was not told he had the right to refuse to
participate in the presentence investigation; (B) he was not aware of the restitution his attorney
had agreed to when petitioner plead guilty; (C) petitioner could not thoroughly review the
presentence report with his counsel; (D) Petitioner was advised against speaking during
sentencing; and (E) counsel was ineffective with respect to Petitioner's right to appeal. These
claims should be summarily dismissed because Petitioner's allegations are disproven by the
record of the criminal proceedings and his allegations do not justify relief as a matter of law.
A. Petitioner was informed by the Court he retained his right to silence, but that his plea
deal depended on his participation in the presentence investigation.

2 The

State does not concede the accuracy of this point, but will treat it as true merely for the purposes of our briefing.
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Although the Petitioner claims he was not informed of his right to refuse to participate in
the presentence investigation, this is disproven by both the record and his written guilty plea. In
his written plea, Petitioner acknowledged his right to silence and his right to refuse to participate
in the presentence investigation. (Guilty Plea, pg. 1 § 2, pg. 6 § 32-33). Additionally, the plea
hearing transcript reflects that this area was the subject of close scrutiny by the Court.
Specifically, the Court inquired:
THE COURT: Have you discussed with your client the fact that I'm going to
order a presentence investigation report to be prepared. And in this case I'm also
going to order a 19-2524 evaluation and that anything he says during those
examinations may be used against him at sentencing?
MR. BLENDER: Yes, your Honor. That is in the guilty plea form so we talked
about that when he signed it.
THE COURT: All right. And did you explain to him that he has a constitutional
right to remain silent during that examination, but as part of the plea agreement,
he agreed to waive that right?
MR. BLENDER: Absolutely.
THE COURT: And was that his decision and his decision only?
MR. BLENDER: He said he understood it and he would engage with the process.
THE COURT: And have you explained to him that if he doesn't engage in the
process, the State will no longer be bound by its agreement?
MR BLENDER: Yes.
(Tr., pg. 14, ln. 25 to pg. 15, ln.23.) The Petitioner was informed that he retained the right to
silence regarding answering questions that might increase his sentence, but that his plea deal
depended on his participation in the presentence investigation. The record and written guilty plea
form demonstrate that petitioner's claim is patently false.
Even assuming arguendo the Petitioner was not adequately advised prior to the Court's
comments, he would not merit relief. The Court can cure the absence of such information prior to
the plea. See Murray, 156 Idaho 159, 321 P.3d 709 and Grant, 156 Idaho at 605, 329 P.3d 380.
Because Petitioner was aware of his right to silence and his right to refuse participation in the
presentence investigation, the State moves to dismiss the petitioner's implied claim that counsel
provided ineffective assistance at the time of his plea.
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B. Petitioner cannot demonstrate that counsel's performance was ineffective because
petitioner was informed of his obligation to pay restitution when he pleaded guilty,
and he did not object to the restitution amount at sentencing.
The Petitioner's implied claim of ineffective assistance of counsel regarding restitution
should be dismissed because his allegations do not present prima facie evidence of deficient
performance. In his Second Affidavit, Petitioner implies that that his counsel's performance was
deficient because he did not inform petitioner of the exact amount of restitution when he pleaded
guilty. Even if true, this allegation would not rise to the level warranting a remedy, and therefore
the claim should be dismissed under summary judgment. Further, this claim is clearly belied by
the record.
To avoid summary dismissal on a claim of an ineffective counsel regarding restitution,
Petitioner must present prima facie evidence that his attorney failed to "either inform his client of
the risk of a restitution order as a consequence of a contemplated guilty plea or to object to the
State's request for restitution at or after sentencing when the defendant was not previously
informed of that consequence." Hayes v. State, 143 Idaho 88, 93, 137 P.3d 475, 480 (Ct. App.
2006). Here, petitioner cannot make such a showing.
Restitution was explicitly a condition of the plea agreement, as described by the
prosecutor prior to entry of plea. (Tr., pg. 4, Ins. 10-15.). The Court clarified that as part of the
plea agreement the Petitioner agreed to pay be restitution on all of the dismissed charges,
restitution on case DR-2014-41181, with such restitution being subject to a civil judgment. (Tr.,
pg. 4, ln.10 to pg. 6, ln. 23; pg. 8, Ins. 15-25). After describing the restitution which Petitioner
was agreeing to pay by pleading guilty, the Court confirmed with defense counsel that the
Court's understating was "an accurate reflection of the plea agreement." (Tr., pg. 8, Ins. 1-3).
The Court specifically inquired whether the Petitioner himself understood that he was
agreeing to pay restitution by pleading guilty. Exploring the adequacy of Petitioner's
understanding of his restitution obligations, the Court asked:
Q. Now you understand that you're agreeing to pay restitution in all of these cases
including the dismissed cases. Do you understand that?
A. Yes, ma'am.
Q. And you're also agreeing to pay restitution in the case that's the DR case,
2014-411861. Do you understand that?

A. And which one would that be, ma'am?
Q. That's the one that- it's the one that they're not going to file on.
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A Yes.
(Tr., pg. 23, ln.15 to pg. 24, ln.l). The Court closely scrutinized the petitioner's understanding of
his restitution obligations under the plea agreement, later examining into the sufficiency of his
written guilty plea. The Court inquired:
Q. And do you understand again about the requirement that you're going to have
to pay restitution to your victims?
A. Yes ma'am.
Q. And I noticed that you crossed yes and then it looks like over no it says -- you
wrote L -- it looks like a signature but I'm not positive. It looks like an initial. But
do you understand that you have to pay restitution to the victims?
A. Yes, ma' am.
(Tr., pg. 27, Ins. 7-17). The Petitioner's responses demonstrate that he clearly understood that he
was obligated to pay restitution, and that he was aware of the amount of restitution. He
acknowledged this responsibility multiple times directly to the Court and through his attorney.
Petitioner had access to discovery documents that indicated restitution would be significant in his
cases. Restitution ultimately amounted to $55,331.92 and $202.75 in Petitioner's cases. (Tr., pg.
36, ln.20 to pg. 37, ln. 7). As to the higher figure, that exact figure, $55,331.92 was in police
reports, DR 411861, which were provided to the petitioner prior to the plea. (Tr., pg. 4, lns.317.)3 The Petitioner had reviewed the discovery prior to the plea. (Tr. Pg. 24, Ins. 17-20.) Thus,
the record reflects that the petitioner knew the figure prior to entry of plea.
Neither the Petitioner nor his attorney objected to the amount of restitution requested at
sentencing. After the prosecutor identified the precise restitution figures, the Court confirmed
with defense counsel that the restitution figures were appropriate. The Court asked:
THE COURT: Is that -- is the amount of restitution, is that something he's going
to be agreeing to?
MR. NEVILLE: It is, Your Honor.
THE COURT: And do you believe there's a sufficient basis to impose those
amounts?
MR. NEVILLE: I do.
(Tr., pg. 36, Ins. 8-14). Not only did counsel acknowledge that petitioner agreed to pay that
specific amount, counsel also conceded there was a sufficient basis to impose the restitution. The

3 Those

same reports were also in the PSI. (See final page of Brad Thome's Supplemental Report, as attached to the

PSI.)
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Court only ordered restitution after confirming with defense counsel that restitution figures were
appropriate.
The Court should dismiss the Petitioner's claim of ineffective counsel considering that
the Petitioner pleaded guilty knowing that he had to pay restitution under the plea deal, at a time
that he had the reports which designated the exact amount later ordered, and because the
Petitioner did not object to the amount of restitution at sentencing. He has not made a prima facie
showing that counsel ineffectively advised him about restitution obligations under the plea deal.
C. Because petitioner was able to review the presentence report with his attorney, any

implied claim of ineffective counsel should be dismissed.

Although petitioner claims he did not believe his counsel reviewed his presentence
reports or evaluations thoroughly with him, such an allegation does not entitle the petitioner to
relief. For example, the petitioner in Jones could not overcome summary judgment dismissal of
an ineffective assistance claim when he alleged that was prevented from reviewing the
presentence report. Jones, 125 Idaho at 296-97, 870 P.2d at 3-4. Although the report was
discussed extensively during sentencing, the petitioner did not object to either his inability to
review the report or to the contents of the report. Id. The Court of Appeals reasoned:
Even assuming the facts alleged in Jones' affidavits are true, Jones has failed to
allege any errors or corrections he would have made at sentencing. Because he
has failed to indicate what errors were contained in the presentence report that
resulted in prejudice, Jones is not entitled to relief. Therefore, the state, as a
matter of law, is entitled to summary judgment. The district court did not err in
summarily dismissing the application for post-conviction relief on these grounds.
Id.
Here, like in Jones, the State is entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law. The
record directly contradicts defendant's claim that he was unable to review the report.

The

petitioner was asked this precise question by the Court and answered in the affirmative:
And with regard to the presentence materials, have both parties had a full
opportunity and sufficient time to examine those presentence materials? ... Mr.
Leytham, have you read those materials?"
The petitioner responded, "Yes, ma'am.
(Tr., pg. 36, ln.22 -pg. 37, ln.5.) .
The record indicates that defense counsel was provided the 19-2522 report by the State
and read the report to the Petitioner when he could not read it himself. (Tr., pg. 37, ln.19- pg. 38,
ln. 7). When asked by the Court if there were any errors in the presentence report, defense
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corrected minor clerical errors. (Tr., pg. 39, ln. 5- pg. 39, ln.10.) Mr. Neville's correction of the
record regarding Petitioner's foot surgery was not substantively significant. However it indicates
the Petitioner and his attorney had reviewed and discussed the report. Neither Petitioner nor his
counsel objected to anything in the presentence report when it was discussed by the prosecutor
and Court at sentencing. Most importantly, the Petitioner identified no errors in the presentence
report that would have caused prejudice. Consequently, the Court should enter summary
judgment dismissing the claim.
D. Petitioner cannot demonstrate that counsel was ineffective in advising Petitioner not
to speak at sentencing.

Advising a client not to speak during sentencing is a tactical decision. The Petitioner has
not shown counsel's choice of tactics was "was unsound or that it resulted from any
shortcomings in counsel's knowledge or preparation." Huck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 160, 857
P.2d 634, 639 (Ct. App. 1993). Petitioner has not articulated how such choice of tactics
constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, or how such advice prejudiced petitioner.
Therefore, any implied claim that that counsel was ineffective in advising petitioner not to speak
at sentencing should be summarily dismissed.
E. Petitioner cannot prove counsel was ineffective respective to his right to appeal.

The Petitioner cannot meet his burden demonstrating that his attorney rendered
ineffective assistance of counsel by failing to file an appeal. Where a Petitioner has instructed
counsel to file an appeal, but counsel did not do as directed, there may be a successful postconviction claim. See Gosch v. State, 154 Idaho 71, 76, 294 P.3d 197, 202 (Ct. App. 2012).
However, that is not the case here. The Petitioner does not allege that he requested an appeal be
filed. Instead, he merely alleges that his counsel did not speak to him about his right to appeal.
(Second Affidavit, pg. 2 paragraph 26.)
Where, as here, the Petitioner did not request an appeal, the review is more strict. The
United States Supreme Court held "that counsel has a constitutionally-imposed duty to consult
with the defendant about an appeal when there is reason to think either ( 1) that a rational
defendant would want to appeal (for example, because there are non-frivolous grounds for
appeal), or (2) that this particular defendant reasonably demonstrated to counsel that he was
interested in appealing." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470,480, 120 S. Ct. 1029, 1033 (2000).
So, counsel had a duty to consult IF there were non-frivolous grounds for an appeal or if the
petitioner demonstrated a desire to appeal.
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Once the duty to consult is established and counsel is shown to have been lacking in this
regard, there still must be a showing of prejudice:
Once counsel's performance has been shown to be deficient, the defendant must
demonstrate actual prejudice by showing that there is a reasonable probability
that, but for counsel's deficient failure to consult with him or her about an appeal,
the defendant would have timely appealed. In ascertaining whether a defendant
has made the requisite showing of prejudice, courts may consider whether there is
evidence of nonfrivolous grounds for appeal or the defendant in question
promptly expressed a desire to appeal. Citations omitted
Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 273-74, 61 P.3d at 630-31. .
Even assuming arguendo that it were true that counsel had failed to consult with
Petitioner about his appeal rights, Petitioner's allegations do not merit a remedy. Notably, the
Petitioner knew of his rights to appeal, as the Court explicitly advised the Petitioner of his appeal
rights at sentencing. (Tr., pg. 64, lns.14-20). Although the record shows petitioner knew of his
appeal rights, Petitioner never alleges that he directed his attorney to appeal or that he even
wanted an appeal. Petitioner does not identify what the non-frivolous grounds for appeal would
have been. Consequently, Petitioner has not demonstrated how he was prejudiced by his
attorney's alleged failure to consult regarding appeal rights. Because Petitioner has not identified
how he was prejudiced by ineffective assistance of counsel, the claim should be summarily
dismissed.
Furthermore, Petitioner cannot demonstrate that counsel knew or should have known that
a rational defendant in their client's position would have wanted to appeal. In determining
whether a rational defendant would have wanted to appeal, "courts must take into account all the
information counsel knew or should have known." State v. Goodwin, 138 Idaho 269, 273, 61
P.3d 626, 630 (Ct. App. 2002). For example, summary dismissal of an ineffective counsel claim
was proper in Goodwin because petitioner has not shown that a rational defendant in his position
would want to appeal the denial of his or her Rule 35 motion State v. Goodwin, 138 Idaho 269,
273, 61 P.3d 626 630 (Ct. App. 2002). The Court examined the information that counsel knew
or should have known, which included the facts that:
(1) Goodwin pled guilty to burglary, a felony punishable by imprisonment for not
less than one nor more than ten years pursuant to I.C. § 18-1403; (2) Goodwin's
sentence was within the statutory sentencing range; (3) Goodwin's offense
involved the taking of more than $ 238,000 worth of coins from a residence; (4)
by pleading guilty Goodwin indicated a desire to end judicial proceedings; (5)
Goodwin did not appeal from his judgment of conviction or sentence; (6) in
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his Rule 35 motion, Goodwin did not challenge the legality or excessiveness of
his sentence, or submit any additional evidence in support of his motion, but
merely requested that the district court reconsider the sentence imposed; (7)
Goodwin's presentence investigation report indicated that he had a significant
criminal record, with numerous felonies involving stolen property; (8) the
presentence investigator recommended imprisonment because Goodwin was not a
suitable candidate for probation; and (9) appellate review of the denial of a Rule
35 motion involves a determination of whether a defendant's sentence was
reasonable at the time of pronouncement or whether the defendant has shown that
his or her sentence is excessive in light of additional information submitted in
support of the motion.

Id at 273, 61 P.3d at 630. The Court concluded that dismissal was proper because there was no
reasonable possibility that Goodwin's sentence would have been reduced had he appealed,
"particularly in light of the severity of Goodwin's offense, his character and criminal record, and
the standard applied by Idaho appellate courts in reviewing the denial of a Rule 35 motion." Id at
274, 61 P.3d at 631.
Just as in Goodwin, dismissal is proper here because petitioner cannot demonstrate that
counsel knew or should have known that a rational defendant in their client's position would
have wanted to appeal. The facts here are remarkably similar to Goodwin in that the information
that Mr. Neville knew or should have known included: (l)Leytham pled guilty to two felonies
(2) Leytham's sentence was within the statutory sentencing range; (3) Mr. Leytham's offense
involved taking more than $50,000 from an elderly victim and stealing a woman's purse; (4) by
pleading guilty Leytham indicated a desire to end judicial proceedings; (5) in his Rule 35 motion,
Mr. Leytham did not challenge the legality or excessiveness of his sentence, or submit any
additional evidence to support his motion, but merely requested that the district court reconsider
the sentence imposed; (6) Mr. Leytham's presentence investigation report indicated that he had a
significant criminal record, with numerous felonies involving stolen property; (7) the presentence
investigator recommended imprisonment because Leytham was not a suitable candidate for
probation. (Tr., pg. 30, ln.11 to pg. 31, ln.22); (Tr., pg. 62, Ins. 1-19); (Tr., 35 ln. 24- pg. 36, ln.
7).
Here, the Court should dismiss petitioner's claim of ineffective counsel. There was no
reasonable possibility that Mr. Leytham's conviction would have been overturned or that his
sentence would have been reduced had he appealed, particularly because of the severity of Mr.
Leytham' s offense and his character and criminal record.
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5.

The Court should dismiss Petitioner's implied claim that his plea was made while
under the influence because none of the Petitioner's medications impaired his ability
to enter an informed guilty plea.

The record undermines any argument that petitioner's medications impaired his ability to
enter a plea. Consequently, the claim should be summarily dismissed without an evidentiary
hearing. To determine whether a plea is knowing, voluntary, and understood
entails inquiry into three areas: (1) whether the defendant's plea was voluntary in
the sense that he understood the nature of the charges and was not coerced; (2)
whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to a jury trial
to confront his accusers, and to refrain from incriminating himself; and (3)
whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading guilty.
State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d 626, 628 (1976). Courts should consider all of the
relevant surrounding circumstances contained in the record to determine if a guilty plea was
knowing and voluntary.
For example, the Court in Workman v. State relied on the record dismissing the
petitioner's claim that his plea was involuntary because his medication impaired his ability to
enter a plea. Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 527-28, 164 P.3d 798, 807-08 (2007). There,
petitioner had been medicated at plea entry and the district judge had,
an opportunity at that time to question Workman to determine his competence and
rational understanding of the proceedings. The district judge thoroughly
documented the evidence in the transcript of the hearing at which Workman
changed his plea and noted her personal observations that "[t]hroughout the
hearing, Workman answered the Court's questions appropriately; moreover, he
exhibited no behavior that indicated an inability to concentrate or an impairment
of his motor or cognitive skills."
Id. The Supreme Court concluded that, based on the record, Workman's claim alleging his
medication rendered his plea involuntary was insufficient to raise an issue of material fact;
therefore "district judge did not err in dismissing, without an evidentiary hearing, Workman's
claim that his plea was involuntary." Workman v. State, 528 Idaho 518, 164 P.3d 798 (2007)
Just like in Workman, here the record demonstrates that Petitioner's medications did not
impair his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary guilty plea. At the plea hearing, Petitioner's
attorney pointed out that petitioner was on medication, including high cholesterol medication,
depression medication, and naproxen and hydrocodone for neck pain. (Tr., pg. 10, ln.2 to pg. 14,
ln.6). Petitioner's attorney noted that any concern he had over the entry of plea was "more based
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on what he might be taking than how he was talking .... I didn't see anything that would make
me believe anything other than he was being strictly rational." (Tr., pg. 11, lns.6-12).

In

response, the Court inquired into the possible effect of petitioner's medication, asking Petitioner:
Q. Now you've indicated that you've been taking a pill for depression and some
other medications and some Hydrocodone for your neck pain; is that correct?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
Q. Are you having any difficulty understanding these proceedings?
A. No, ma'am.
Q. And you've been taking all of these medications for some time, about 45 days
you said.
A. Just take depression for 45. The rest of them I've been taking since 2005.
Q. Okay. Normally by this time any of these medications any effects have been
stabilized. But I just want to make sure you are having any sleepiness or any
difficulty understanding what we are talking about today?
A. No, Your Honor.
Q. Did they make you more susceptible to Mr. Blender's suggestions?
A. Yes, Your Honor.
Q. They did? So your -- Mr. Blender's suggestion - these medications made you
more susceptible to those?
A. No, ma'am. I'm sorry. I misunderstood you.
Q. You misunderstood my question?
A. Yes, ma' am.
Q. Okay. And these are your decisions, not Mr. Blender's decisions?
A. Yes, ma' am.
Q. And again, just for the record, his answers seem appropriate to me, his affect is
appropriate. We've got great contact. He's not slurring his words. He doesn't'
appear sleepy. His answers do not seem inappropriate to me.

(Tr., pg. 19, ln.25 to pg. 21, ln.14). After examining the Petitioner regarding his medication, the
Court asked questions regarding his mental health and whether he understood the consequences
of pleading guilty. (Tr., pg. 21, ln.24 to pg. 22, ln.20). Having examined the Petitioner to see if
his medication or mental health had affected his ability to enter a plea, and having examined
petitioner's understanding of the plea deal, the district judge concluded that the "guilty plea was
knowingly and voluntarily given." (Tr., pg. 32, ln.8).
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Based upon the colloquy between the Court and Mr. Leytham, there is ample evidence
that Petitioner's plea was knowingly and voluntary, and that he had a rational understanding of
the proceedings. The District Court's examination into petitioner's mental capacity and
understanding of his plea indicates that neither the Court, defense attorney, nor Petitioner himself
believed the medications affected his understanding of his guilty plea. Consequently, Petitioner's
claim that medications affected his ability to enter a knowing and voluntary plea should be
dismissed pursuant to summary judgment without an evidentiary hearing.
CONCLUSION

The State moves for dismissal of each and every claim. Post-conviction proceedings
need not, in every circumstance, proceed to an evidentiary hearing. In fact, when "it appears
from the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of
fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine issue of material fact and the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law," the Court may grant a motion for
summary disposition. LC. §19-4906(c). Such is the case here and the State hereby moves the
Court to dismiss the petition in its entirety.

-0:DATED this;Qday of July 2015.
JAN M. BENNETTS
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

~
By: Shawna Dunn
Deputy Prosecuting Attorney
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CERTIFIC~~I_OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on this cf!:day of July 2015, I caused to be served, a true and

correct copy of the foregoing Motion for Summary Dismissal upon the individuals named below in
the manner noted:
Name and address: Lance Fuisting, Ada County Public Defender, 200 W. Front St. Room 1107,
Boise, Idaho 83 702
o By depositing copies of the same in the United States mail, postage prepaid, first class.
~.BY depositing copies of the same in the Interdepartmental Mail.
o By informing the office of said individual(s) that said copies were available for pickup at the office
of the Ada County Prosecutor.
o By fuxing copies of the same to said attomey(s) at t h ~
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ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Defendant
LANCE L. FUISTING, ISB #7791
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,
Case No. CV-PC-2015-2841
Petitioner,
OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR
SUMMARY DISMISSAL

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

COMES NOW, the petitioner, Jimmy D. Leytham, by and through counsel, Lance

Fuisting, of the Ada County Public Defender's Office and herein objects to the State's Motion
for Summary Dismissal to his Petition for Post-Conviction Relief pursuant to I. C. § 19-4906(c)
on the basis that genuine issues of material fact have been raised by the petitioner in his
pleadings which require an evidentiary hearing to be held and that his petition for post conviction
relief should be granted.
1
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STANDARD OF REVIEW
Mr. Leytham's claims involved allegations that he received ineffective assistance of
counsel during his guilty plea and sentencing. The Sixth Amendment right to counsel guarantees
a criminal defendant effective assistance of counsel. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668,
685-86 (1984). Idaho has adopted the Strickland two-prong test in evaluating whether a criminal
defendant was denied the right to effect assistance of counsel. Dunlap v. State, 141 Idaho 50, 59
(2004). Specifically, a defendant must prove both that his or her counsel's performance was
deficient, and that counsel's deficient performance prejudiced his or her case. Id. To show
deficient performance, a defendant must demonstrate that his or her attorney's representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness. Id. To show prejudice, the defendant must show
a reasonable probability that, but for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the
case would have been different. Id. A defendant must prove his claims by a preponderance of
the evidence. Id. at 56. Even if individual claims do not independently show prejudice, the
Court must consider whether the accumulation of error creates the degree of prejudice entitling a
petition to relief. Mak v. Blodgett, 970 F .2d 614 (9th Cir. 1992).
When assessing the reasonableness of counsel's decisions, this Court owes deference to
counsel's strategic decisions; however, "[t]he relevant question is not whether counsel's choices
were strategic, but whether they were reasonable." Roe v. Flores-Ortega, 528 U.S. 470 481
(2000) (citation omitted).
Mr. Leytham asserts all claims of ineffective assistance of counsel alleged satisfy both
prongs of the Strickland analysis. Specifically, Mr. Leytham's claims for relief show (1) a
deficiency in trial counsel's performance, and (2) that Mr. Leytham was prejudiced by the
deficient performance. See generally Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687. Mr. Leytham alleges that
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even if some individual claims do not meet the governing level of prejudice independently, when
considered collectively, the accumulation of error creates prejudice entitling him to relief.
Blodgett, 970 F.2d 614.

Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes summary disposition of an application for postconviction relief, either upon the motion of a party or at the court's own initiative. Martinez v.
State, 126 Idaho 813, 816, 892 P.2d 488,491 (Idaho App. 1995). Summary dismissal is

permissible only if the applicant's evidence has raised no genuine issue of material fact, which, if
resolved in the applicant's favor, would entitle him to the requested relief. Id. If such a factual
issue is presented, an evidentiary hearing must be conducted. Id.

1

1

The State has argued in its Motion for Summary Dismissal that Mr. Leytham's claims are clearly disproven by the
record. Several of Mr. Leytham's claims involve communications or lack thereof with his counsel in the underlying
criminal case, and many of those claims are not addressed in the record. On May 26, 2015, Mr. Leytham requested
that this Court allow him to conduct a deposition of his counsel on the underlying case to address the issues he has
presented which are not in the record. This Court denied the Motion for Discovery on June 3, 2015.
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ISSUES PRESENTED
I.

Did Mr. Leytham receive ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a
failure to investigate the issues in his case?

II.

Did Mr. Leytham receive ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a
failure to advise him correctly about his guilty plea?

III.

Did Mr. Leytham receive ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a
breakdown in communications between himself and counsel?
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ARGUMENT

I.

Mr. Leytham received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a failure
to investigate the issues in his case.

Trial counsel must conduct a reasonable investigation. Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510,
523 (2003). ("[W]e focus on whether the investigation supporting counsel's decision ... was
itself reasonable." (emphasis in in original) (citation omitted)); Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691

(holding that counsel has a "duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a reasonable
decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary"); Conner v. Quarterman, 4 77 F .3d
287, 296-94 (5th Cir. 2007). (The judgment is whether counsel's investigation was reasonable,
not whether counsel's trial strategy was reasonable.") (citation omitted).
The most glaring and prejudicial deficiency regarding a failure to investigate involved
counsel's failure to obtain Mr. Leytham's medical records. In page 2 of Mr. Leytham's Second
and Final Affidavit in Support of Petition for Post Conviction Relief, Mr. Leytham states:
12)

I told Mr. Neville about my medical conditions.

13)

Mr. Neville did not attempt to obtain my medical records.

14)

There was no proof about my medical conditions to supply to the Court at the
time of sentencing.

The lack of documentation of medical conditions was clearly viewed as an aggravating
factor by this Court at the Sentencing Hearing held on December 31, 2014. (Transcript of
Proceedings December 31, 2014, The Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, pp. 50-53) (Hereinafter, TR.
December 31, 2014). At that hearing, the following exchange occurred after Mr. Neville
attempted to explain some of Mr. Leytham's medical conditions to the court:
THE COURT:

We never got copies of any medical records other than Dr. Verska and
then the letter from his internist; is that correct?

MR. NEVILLE:

That's correct.
5
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THE COURT:

So these are just what he says.

MR. NEVILLE:

Correct.

THE COURT:

Thank.you.

MR. NEVILLE:

However, I - - well, from what he's telling me, this foot surgery is
something that's been diagnosed in his recent stay.
Also, I think the thing he's suffering from the most is his lupus.

THE COURT:

Where is the evidence that he has lupus?

MR. NEVILLE:

Well, just an example, I think the Ada County Jail has even called in a
specialist recently on this because they're not finding - - they're not being
successful in treating it. I can attest that any time - -

THE COURT:

Because his internist does not list lupus as a diagnosis and he's not taking
medication for lupus.

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, ma'am, I am.
THE COURT:

I'm not going to - - I'm not asking you.

THE DEFENDANT: Sorry.
MR. NEVILLE:

Your Honor- -

THE COURT:

The only medical record that I have - - I have nothing from the jail. The
only medical records that I have is the undated letter from Dr. Verska
which doesn't tell me anything other than he's not capable of working.
And the other letter I have is from the other doctor, which I can go back
and figure out what the name is, and he indicates he has allergies - - I'm
trying to remember. The medication he's taking is for allergies.

MR. NEVILLE:

Your Honor, if I could ask my client.

THE COURT:

Well, I'm not - - to be honest with you, I haven't found your client to be a
very honest person based on what's in this presentence and the fact that
we have - - we have pictures of him stealing, so

MR. NEVILLE:

I understand.

THE COURT:

I know he writes this stuff.

MR. NEVILLE:

I understand.
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THE COURT:

-- but that doesn't tell me anything.

MR. NEVILLE:

I understand the Court is-doesn't have much reason to believe him ....
(TR. December 31, 2014, p. 51 L.6-p.53 L. 6).

The relevant inquiry under the case law is whether it was a reasonable decision not to
investigate the medical conditions and provide documentation to the Court prior to attempting to
argue them to the Court at the sentencing. In terms of prejudice to Mr. Leytham, this failure to
conduct an investigation offered the Court another opportunity to question Mr. Leytham's
credibility and what could have become a mitigating factor at sentencing became an aggravating
factor. Therefore, it was an unreasonable decision not to obtain the medical records, which
amounted to ineffective assistance of counsel on both Strickland prongs.2
II.

Mr. Leytham received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a failure
to advise him correctly about his guilty plea?

A defendant's constitutional right to counsel extends to the "critical stages" of
proceedings. US. v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218, 224-25, 87 S.Ct 1926, 19 L Ed. 1149 (1967). "Before
deciding whether to plead guilty, a defendant is entitled to "the effective assistance of competent
counsel." Padilla v. Kentucky, 559 U.S. 356, 364, 130 S.Ct. 1473, 176 L.Ed 2d 284 (284).
Mr. Leytham has alleged numerous deficiencies on behalf of counsel in regards to advice
regarding his guilty plea. On page 2 of his First Affidavit of Petitioner, Mr. Leytham makes the
following claims regarding his guilty plea:
13.

When I spoke to Mr. Neville in person, he explained that he had this "great deal" worked
out for me. I explained to Mr. Neville that I did not want to enter into a guilty plea as I
was not guilty.

The medical records were subsequently obtained by Mr. Leytham's Post Conviction counsel and filed as an
addendum to his Motion for Reconsideration of Sentence under Idaho Criminal Rule 35 on April 28, 2015. That
motion was denied without objection from the State on April 30, 2015.
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14.

Mr. Neville informed me," .. hey, do not worry about it, just plead guilty and they are
going to give you probation."

15.

At the time I appeared before the Court, the Court read to me the Guilty Plea Advisory
Form. When I was asked if," ... there has been any type of promises to you," Mr.
Neville told me to say there was no promises. I asked about the probation he had
promised. Mr. Neville told me," ... that is not what the Court is asking about."

16.

I informed Mr. Neville, "sir, I need some time to think about this". Mr. Neville told me,
"Hey, this is a done deal, you are going to get probation, so you have about 15 minutes,
just plead guilty and you will get probation."

17.

I did as my attorney advised me to do. I entered the plea of guilty. However, when the
Court sentenced me, I received a sentence of ten (10) years ...
The State has pointed out that Mr. Leytham's allegations in his affidavit are not

consistent with his answers on the Guilty Plea Advisory Form, nor are they consistent his
answers to the Court during his guilty plea. Mr. Leytham has indicated that he did not fill out the
Guilty Plea Advisory Form entirely on his own and that he was being advised to answer the
Court's questions a certain way by his counsel during his guilty plea. Most of the conversations
with his attorney to which he alludes are not a part of the record. Mr. Leytham has attempted to
conduct discovery during his post conviction case to clarify these issues of fact; however, this
Court has denied his request. Because his allegations create genuine issues of fact that would
have amounted to ineffective assistance during his guilty plea, which is a critical stage of the
proceedings, he should be entitled to an evidentiary hearing on this issue.
The same holds true for Mr. Leytham's allegations about Mr. Neville claiming to have a
positive social relationship with the judge. We know what Mr. Leytham has said in his affidavit,
but we have not formally heard Mr. Neville's side of that discussion. Again, a deposition would
have been helpful. The State has argued that even if that allegation was true, it would have
worked to Mr. Leytham's benefit. Clearly, given Mr. Leytham's dissatisfaction with his
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sentence, whatever situation existed did not work to his benefit. However, an evidentiary
hearing is required to determine this issue of fact because it is not a part of the record.

III.

Mr. Leytham received ineffective assistance of counsel based upon a
breakdown in communications between himself and counsel.

The Idaho appellate courts have recognized the claim of ineffective assistance of counsel
for counsel's failure to communicate. Thomas v. State, 145 Idaho 765, 768, 185 P.3d 921, 924
(Idaho App. 2008). Mr. Leytham has made several allegations related not only to failure to
communicate, but also what could be deemed unreasonable communications under Strickland.
In his First Affidavit, Mr. Leytham makes the following allegations:
9.

I was scheduled for a court hearing on September 10, 2014. I spoke to Mr. Neville and
he told me that he would contact me on the ih of September to see if I could reschedule
the court date on the 1oth.
I asked this to be rescheduled because I had a job out of town and I did not know if I
could get back before the court date.

10.

Mr. Neville never did contact me as to whether or not my court date was rescheduled.

11.

When I returned from out of town, I did make it to my court date on the 1oth of
September, 2014. However, Mr. Neville did not show up. He forgot about me and my
court date. A Mr. Brian Blender filled in for Mr. Neville; but Blender did not know about
my case.

12.

My wife called Mr. Neville's telephone several times to find out what was going on and
what happened to him at the court date. There was never any type of return call from Mr.
Neville.
In his Second Affidavit, Mr. Leytham makes the following allegations regarding lack of

or ineffective communications:

4.

On the day I plead guilty, September 10, 2014, Brian Blender, who works with Mr.
Neville, appeared to represent me.

5.

I did not know Mr. Blender would be appearing prior to September 10, 2014.

6.

I only had a 7 to 10 minute discussion with Mr. Blender prior to pleading guilty on
September 10, 2014.
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7.

Mr. Blender and I did not discuss restitution on September 10, 2014.

8.

I was taking numerous medications at the time of my change of plea.

9.

I believe the medications I was taking on September 10, 2014, impacted my ability to
understand the proceedings.

10.

I initially informed the Court that the drugs I was on made me more susceptible to
suggestions from Mr. Blender during my change of plea on September 10, 2014.

15.

Neither Mr. Neville or Mr. Blender explained to me that I had a right not to participate in
the presentence investigation process.

16.

There was no discussion about the restitution amount during my change of plea hearing.

17.

At sentencing, my attorney agreed to $55,331.92 in restitution for uncharged conduct on
my behalf. I was never asked if I agreed to that amount.

18.

I believed the restitution was $202.75. That was the amount in my presentence report.

19.

My attorney did not show me the presentence report until the day of sentencing.

20.

My attorney only showed me Dr. Arnold's evaluation on the day of sentencing.

21.

I was unable to read the presentence report and evaluation myself because of a medical
condition.

22.

I do not believe my attorney read me Dr. Arnold's evaluation in its entirety.

23.

I do not believe my attorney thoroughly reviewed the presentence report and evaluations
with me.

24.

My attorney only read the recommendations section of the presentence report to me.

25.

I was advised not to say anything when I had the opportunity to address the Court at
sentencing.

26.

Neither Mr. Neville nor Mr. Blender spoke to me about my right to appeal my sentence.

27.

No appeal of my sentence was filed.
While there is an indication from the record that there was some degree of

communication between the attorneys and Mr. Leytham, it is important to consider the
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reasonableness of that communication based on the fact that Mr. Neville made the following
statement about Mr. Leytham at sentencing:
"I do not think Mr. Leytham is somebody who sees himself as a liar. I do think he has an
extremely hard time with his memory. From one conversation to the next he does not
track nor does he remember what we've talked about." (TR. December 31, 2014, p.53).
Moreover, at the change of plea hearing on September 10, 2014, Mr. Blender made the following
statement to the court regarding whether he had reason to believe that Mr. Leytham was under
the influence of alcohol or medication:
"He-there were some other medications. He may not know what they are that he could
be under the influence of, but he seems mostly rational." (Transcript of Proceedings,
September 10, 2014, The Honorable Cheri C. Copsey, p. 10, L. 6-9).
At no point did either counsel request that Mr. Leytham's competency be evaluated or
that proceedings be continued in spite of making the record that he does not remember their
conversations and that he might be taking medications that "he could be under the influence of."
In State v. Cobb, it was error for the district court to summarily dismiss the defendant's
application for post conviction relief without granting an evidentiary hearing, where there existed
a material issue of fact as to whether the defendant was under the influence of prescribed drugs
which affected his ability to make a knowing, intelligent, and voluntary guilty plea. 100 Idaho
116, 594 P.2d 154 (1979). In light of the knowledge that both counsel had of Mr. Leytham's
issues, it was not objectively reasonable for them to proceed with a guilty plea or sentencing
under the circumstances, nor was it objectively reasonable to proceed with substitute counsel
who only had a short period of time to meet with Mr. Leytham prior to his entry of a guilty plea.
Mr. Leytham has indicated that he did not want to plead guilty, but he did so based on
representation from counsel that he would receive probation. We have no real evidence to
controvert his claim, which mandates an evidentiary hearing.
11
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Additionally, it is clear from the record that the significantly-higher restitution amount
for the uncharged conduct was never mentioned in open court at either hearing prior to the
judgment, nor was Mr. Leytham ever personally asked on the record ifhe agreed to that amount.
There is not clear evidence in the record to controvert Mr. Leytham's claim about the
amount of time his attorney spent with him reviewing the presentence materials, although the
transcript suggested that that discussion did happen close to the time of sentencing.
It is clear from the record that no appeal of Mr. Leytham's sentence was filed. A

defendant's right to representation by counsel extends to all critical stages of his trial, including
appeal. Beasley v. State, 126 Idaho 356, 359, 883 P.2d 714 (Idaho App. 1994). Mr. Leytham
contends that he never had any discussions about an appeal with either attorney. We do not
know what the attorneys' position is on that claim. All of these questions of fact suggest that an
evidentiary hearing is appropriate.
Conclusion

The State's Motion for Summary Judgment should be denied because genuine issues of
material fact have been raised by the petitioner in his pleadings which require an evidentiary
hearing to be held and his petition for post conviction relief should be granted.

Lance Fuistin
Attorney for Petitioner
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this~ day of August 2015, I mailed (served) a true
and correct copy of the within instrument to:
Shawna Dunn
Ada County Prosecuting Attorney

OBJECTION TO MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL

13

000098

·.

J.I

AUG 2 8 2015
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH. Clc,r~
'3v KRISTI DUMOti .

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRifCT OF
1

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

2
3

4

JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,

5
6

Case No. CV-PC-2015-02841

Petitioner,
vs.

7

THE STATE OF IDAHO,

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY
DISMISSAL

8

Respondent.
9

10

On February 25, 2015, Jimmy Leytham, filed a Petition pro se 1 and requested the Court

11

appoint counsel. The Court granted his request that same date. The Court held a status conference

12

and at Leytham's request continued the status conference to allow him to file a Rule 35 in the
underlying cases. The Court stayed proceedings pending the Rule 35 decision. His new counsel

13

14
15
16
17

filed the Rule 35, and the Court denied his Rule 35.
At the continued hearing, his counsel requested more time and the Court rescheduled the
scheduling conference again to June 17, 2015.
Leytham moved for discovery, more specifically allowing him to take depositions of his
trial counsel which the Court denied.
Leytham did not amend his Petition. The State answered and moved for summary dismissal

18

on June 17, 2015. On August 24, 2015, Leytham replied to the State's motion.
19

The Court takes judicial notice of the following documents from the underlying criminal

20

action, Case Nos. CR-FE-2014-3478/CR-FE-2014-5269: Guilty Plea Advisory Form completed by

21

Leytham, presentence report (including LC. § 19-2522 evaluation), Clerk Minutes dated November

22

23
24

25

1 "Prose litigants are held to the same standards and rules as those represented by an attorney." Twin Falls Cnty. v.
Coates, 139 Idaho 442, 445, 80 P.3d 1043, 1046 (2003). Prose litigants are not accorded any special consideration
simply because they are representing themselves and are not excused from adhering to procedural rules. Nelson v.
Nelson, 144 Idaho 710, 170 P.3d 375,383 (2007); Sammis v. Magnetek, Inc., 130 Idaho 342,346,941 P.2d 314,318
(1997); Golay v. Loomis, 118 Idaho 387, 392, 797 P.2d 95, 100 (1990), quoting Golden Condor, Inc. v. Bell, 112
Idaho 1086, 1089 n.5, 739 P.2d 385,388 n.5 (1987).
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12, 2014, Case Nos. CR-FE-2014-5269, transcripts dated September 10, 2014 (guilty plea) and
1

December 31, 2014 (sentencing).
2

3

Based on the following, the Court grants the State's motion and dismisses Leytham's
Petition.

BACKGROUND

4

Leytham pled guilty to the two cases on September 10, 2014, pursuant to a plea agreement

5

6

where the State agreed to not charge him as a persistent violator and agreed to dismiss several
charges. The State was free to ask for a prison sentence for up to ten years. Leytham agreed to pay

7

all restitution even on the dismissed charges and on DR#2014-41186I. 2 The State also indicated it
8

was investigating other similar cases.

9

Before entering the plea, Leytham completed the Court's3 written guilty plea form.

10

Leytham testified that he reads and understands English and that he actually reviewed the form and

11

agreed with the circled answers. He also testified that it was his signature on the front and back of

12

the form and he had initialed the statement of rights. Finally he testified that the answers were true
and correct.

13

He also testified that he had reviewed all of that evidence, that he understood that by

14

pleading guilty he was admitting the truth of all the allegations. Leytham also testified that there

15

was nothing that he had asked his attorney to do that he had not done and that he was waiving all

16

defenses, both factual and legal. Leytham testified that he understood that the Court could impose

17

up to nineteen (19) years without possibility of parole and that the Court was not bound by any
recommendation made by either his trial counsel or the State.

18

Among other things during the plea hearing, Leytham also agreed that he had had enough
19

time with his attorney, had fully discussed all the facts and circumstances of the charge, and that

20

he was satisfied with his attorney's services. Leytham also agreed that he admitted to the truth of

21

the charge as stated in the Count I and that he was guilty of the acts and conduct charged. He also

22

answered the subsequent questions in the written guilty plea form as follows:

23
24

2

25

3

This investigation involved his defrauding Washington Federal Savings and is the restitution imposed in Case No.
CR-FE-2014-3478.

It was actually the Honorable Judge Rippler's form.
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J,

10.
There are two types of plea agreements. Please initial the ONE paragraph
below which describes the type of plea you are entering. DO NOT INITIAL
BOTH PARAGRAPHS:

1

2

a.
I understand that the court is NOT bound by the plea agreement or any
sentencing recommendations, and may impose any sentence authorized by law,
including the maximum sentence stated above. Because the court is not bound by
the agreement, if the district court chooses not to follow the agreement, I will not
JL 4
have the right to withdraw my guilty plea.

3
4

5

***
14. Is there anything you have requested your attorney to do that has not been done?
YesDNo0

6
7

***
21. Do you understand that by pleading guilty you waive any defenses, both factual and
legal, that you believe you may have in this case?
Yes 0 No D

8
9

22. Are there any motions or other requests for relief that you believe should still be filed
in this case?
Yes D No 0

10

If you answered "yes," what motions or requests? _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ __
11

23. Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you are admitting the truth of
each and every allegation contained in the charge(s) to which you plead guilty?

12

Yes 0No D

13

***

14

40. Do you understand that no one, including your attorney, can force you to plead guilty
in this case?
Yes 0 No D

15

Yes 0No D

41. Are you pleading guilty freely and voluntarily?
16

42. Are you pleading guilty because you committed the acts alleged in the information or
indictment?
Yes 0 No D

17

***
18

44. Has any person (including a law enforcement officer or police office) threatened you or
done anything to make you enter this plea against your will?
Yes D No 0

19

If your

20

answer

is

"yes,"

what

threats

have

been made

and

by

whom?

21

45. Other than in the plea agreement, has any person promised you that you will receive
any special sentence, reward, favorable treatment, or leniency with regard to the plea you
are about to enter?
Yes D No 0

22
23
24
25

4

This was in Leytham's handwriting.
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If your answer is "yes," what promises have been made and by whom?
1

2
3

46. Do you understand that the only person who can promise what sentence you will
actually receive is the Judge?
Yes 0 No D
Has the Judge made any promises to you?

Yes D No0

4

47. Are you satisfied with your attorney?

Yes 0 No D

5

48. Have you answered all questions on this Questionnaire truthfully and of your own free
will?
Yes 0 No D

6
7

8
9

10
11

49. Have you had any trouble answering any of the questions in this form which you could
not work out by discussing the issue with your attorney?
Yes D No 0
50. IF YOU ARE NOT A CITIZEN OF THE UNITED STATES, do you understand that
by pleading guilty you are presumptively deportable, meaning that you will be removed
from the United States and returned to your country of origin, and lose your ability to
obtain legal status in the United States, or be denied an application for United States
citizenship?
YES NO NIA
51. Do you swear under penalty of perjury that your answers to these questions are
true and correct?
Yes 0 No D

12

(Emphasis in the original.) At the end of the form he affirmed the truth of his questionnaire as

13

follows by signing the bottom of the form:

14
15

I have answered the questions on pages 1-8 of this Guilty Plea Advisory form
truthfully. I understand all of the questions and answers herein, have discussed each
question and answer with my attorney, and have completed this form freely and
voluntarily. Furthermore, no one has threatened me to do so.

16

Leytham signed the form and dated it on September 10, 2014. Before accepting his plea, the Court
17

engaged in the following colloquy with Leytham regarding the crimes:

18

DIRECT EXAMINATION

19

Q.
All right. And now I understand you filled out some of this guilty plea form
in your own handwriting; is that right?

20
21
22

23
24
25

A.
Yes, I did, Your Honor. I think he already circled about three squares and I
did everything else.
Q.

Okay. So just the ones that he circled; is that right?

A.

Yes, Your Honor.

Okay. Well, I'm -- I'm going to go through this to make this these are your
Q.
answers.
Now, that's your signature I see on the front and back; is that right?
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r
A.

Yes, ma'am.

1

2

Q.
And when we talk about the statement of rights, I see what looks like initials
with a J and an L Are those your initials?
A.

Yes, they are.

Q.

And did you read those paragraphs before you initialed them?

A.

Yes, ma'am.

5

Q.

And so those are not your attorney's initials?

6

A.

No,ma'am.

7

Q.
Did you have any trouble understanding what those portions of the guilty
plea form meant?

3

4

8
9

10

A.

No, ma'am.

Q.
Now, you've indicated that you've been taking a pill for depression as well
as some other medications and some Hydrocodone for your neck pain; is that
correct?

11

A.

Yes, Your Honor.

12

Q.

Are you having any difficulty understanding these proceedings?

A.

No, ma'am.

13
14

Q.
And you have been taking all of these medications for some time, about 45
days you said?

15

A.

16
17

Just take depression for 45. The rest of them I've been taking since 2005.

Q.
Okay. Normally by this time in any of these medications any effects have
stabilized. But I just want to make sure are you having any sleepiness or any
difficulty understanding what we're talking about here today?
A.

No, Your Honor.

18
19

Q.
And do you feel that these medications prevented you from knowingly and
voluntarily deciding to plead guilty?

20

A.

No, Your Honor.

Q.

Did they make you more susceptible to Mr. Blender's suggestions?

A.

Yes, Your Honor.

21

22
23

Q.
They did? So your -- Mr. Blender's suggestion -- these medications made
you more susceptible to those?
A.

No, ma'am. I'm sorry. I misunderstood you.

Q.

You misunderstood my question?

A.

Yes,ma'am.

24

25
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Q.

Okay. And so these are your decisions, not Mr. Blender's decisions?

A.

Yes, ma'am.

1

2

Q.
And, again, iust for the record, his answers seem appropriate to me, his
affect is appropriate. We've got great eye contact. He's not slurring his words. He
doesn't appear sleepy. His answers do not seem inappropriate to me. Is there
anyone here who would disagree with that?

3

4

MS. DUNN: No, Your Honor.

5

THE COURT: Mr. Blender?
6

MR. BLENDER: No, Your Honor. I agree with what he said.

7

THE COURT: Mr. Leytham?

8

THE DEFENDANT: I agree with what you said, ma 'am.
THE COURT: Great.

9

Q. BY THE COURT: Now, a couple more questions. You're under the care of Dr.
Fred Rice; is that right?

10

A.
Yes, I am. He is one of my clients plus he's also a psychologist and I talk to
him once in a while.

11

12

Q.

13

Well, who is prescribing the depression medication?

That would be my doctor, Dr. Fox, Michael Fox out of Kuna Advanced
A.
Care.

14

15
16

Q.

Okay. So you've been seeing these people for some time?

A.

Yes, ma'am.

Q.
What was the diagnosis that you got? You said you were diagnosed in 1979.
Tell me what that was.

17

A.

I'm a schizophrenic and a split personality, ma'am.

18

Q.

Okay. So what are you taking for schizophrenia? 5

19

A.

Nothing. I grew out of that within years.

20

Q.
Okay. Is there anything else that you think might affect your ability to
understand the questions or make a decision in this case?

21
22

A.

No,ma'am.

Q.

Now, you understand I'm not required to follow this plea agreement?

23

24
25

The Court ordered an I.C. § 19-2522 evaluation and the psychologist diagnosed him with Dysthymic Disorder with a
provisional diagnosis of Generalized Anxiety Disorder. He also diagnosed him with a Personality Disorder and
Borderline Intellectual functioning. Nothing in the evaluation suggested he was not competent.

5
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A.

Yes, ma'am, I understand.

1

3

0.
What that means is I can actually give you a 14-year prison sentence in the
forgery case and a five-year prison sentence in the financial transaction card case
and I can run them consecutive to each other for a total of 19 years without the
possibility of parole. Do you understand that?

4

A.

5

Q.
And I'm not required to follow recommendations of either counsel. Do you
understand that?

6

A.

2

7

8
9

Yes, ma'am.

Yes, ma'am.

Q.
Now, you understand that you're agreeing to pay restitution in all of these
cases including the dismissed cases. Do you understand that?
A.

Yes,ma'am.

Q.
And you're also agreeing to pay restitution in the case that's the DR case, 20
14-41 1861. Do you understand that?

10

A.

Which one would that be, ma'am?

Q.

That's the one that -- it's the one that they're not going to file on.

12

A.

Yes.

13

Q.
All right. And you understand again that because these are two crimes that I
can run them consecutive to each other?

11

14

A.

15

Q.
You also understand that if I don't follow this plea agreement, you will not
be allowed to withdraw your guilty plea? Do you understand that?

Yes, ma'am.

16

A.
17
18

19

20
21

I understand.

Q.

You understand the only person who can make any promises to you as to
what's going to happen at sentencing is me?
A.

Yes, ma'am.

Q.

Have I made you any promises?

A.

No, ma'am.

Q.

Have you reviewed the evidence that was provided to your attorney
provided during discovery?

22

A.
23
24

Yes, I have.

Q.

Is there anything that your attorney has -- that you've asked your attorney to
do that he has not done?
A.

No, ma'am.

25
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1

Q.
And have you told your attorney everything that you know about these
crimes?

2

A.

Yes,ma'am.

Q.

Have you had enough time to talk to your attorney?

A.

Yes, ma'am.

0.

Are there witnesses who can demonstrate you are innocent of this crime?

5

A.

No,ma'am.

6

Q.
Now, you said - you answered no and then underneath it says if you
answered yes, have you told your attorney who those witnesses are and you said
yes. But there aren't any witnesses, are there, who could show you were innocent?

3
4

7

8
9

10
11

12
13

A.

No, ma'am.

Q.
Now, you understand that because this is an unconditional guilty plea, you
would not be able to challenge any rulings that came before the guilty plea
including any search or seizures that occurred in this case or any issues about the
manner of arrest or any statements that you made? Do you understand that?
A.

Yes,ma'am.

Q.
Now, you've indicated that you've waived your right to appeal the judgment
as part of your plea agreement and my understanding of the plea agreement you are
not waiving that. Do you understand that?
Yes, ma'am.

14

A.

15

Q.
So you can still you understand that?

16

A.

Yeah.

17

Q.

Okay?

18

A.

Yes, ma'am.

if you don't like my sentence, you can appeal that. Do

19

Q.
Are there any promises that have been made to you that influenced your
decision to plead guilty -

20

A.

No, ma'am.

21

Q.

-- besides the plea agreement?

A.

No.

22
23

Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you waive -- you give up all
0.
of your defenses including factual and legal defenses? Do you understand that?

24

A.

Yes, ma'am.

Q.

Are there any motions that you think your attorney should have filed?

A.

No, ma'am.

25
26
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e

J

1

Q.
Do you understand that when you plead guilty, you're admitting the truth of
each and every allegation to those charges to which you plead guilty?

2

A.

3

Yes, ma'am.

(Emphasis added.) The Court accepted his plea as knowingly and voluntarily given and set the
case for sentencing. The Court set sentencing for November 12, 2014.

4

On November 12, 2014, Leytham and his trial counsel, Mr. Neville, appeared. At this point
5

the Court and counsel had read the presentence report where Leytham attempts to minimize his

6

involvement in these crimes and claim innocence. The Court, Mr. Neville and Leytham discussed

7

his new claim. Mr. Neville requested the Court order an evaluation pursuant to LC. § 19-2522,

8

which the Court did. The Court also rescheduled his sentencing. see Clerk Minutes dated

9

November 12, 2014, Case Nos. CR-FE-2014-5269. The Court asked Leytham whether he
committed the crimes and he indicated that he did and volunteered to the Court that he was not

10

coerced and that there was no evidence of any kind that anyone forced him to plead guilty. Id.
11

On December 31, 2014, the Court sentenced Jimmy D. Leytham in CR-FE-2014-3478 on

12

Count II., Forgery, Felony, LC. § 18-3601, to an aggregate term often (10) years, with a minimum

13

period of confinement of five (5) years, followed by a subsequent indeterminate period of custody

14

not to exceed five (5) years. The State dismissed Counts I and III, Forgery, as part of a plea

15

agreement and the Court ordered restitution in the amount of $55,331.92.
That same date, the Court sentenced Jimmy D. Leytham in CR-FE-2014-5269 on Count II,

16

Criminal Possession of a Financial Transaction Card, Felony, LC. § 18-3125 to an aggregate term
17

of five (5) years, with a minimum period of confinement of zero (0) years, followed by a

18

subsequent indeterminate period of custody not to exceed five (5) years. The State dismissed

19

Count I, Grand Theft, Felony, LC.§ 18-2403(2)(c) and agreed to not have him charged a persistent

20

violator. The Court ordered that this case run consecutively to CR-FE-2014-3478. 6 The Court
further ordered restitution in the amount of $202.75.

21

Leytham's post-conviction counsel, Lance Fuisting, timely filed
22
23

a Motion for

Reconsideration of Sentence pursuant to Rule 35, LC.R., on April 28, 2015. Leytham appealed.
That appeal is pending.

24

25

6

Leytham is technically only pursuing post-conviction relief in case number CR-FE-2014-00034 78.
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This was at least Leytham' s 8th felony conviction which included Burglary (1978 7 , 1979),
1

Issuing a Check Without Funds (1978), Disposing of Stolen Property (1979), Escape from a
2

Penitentiary (1979), and Grand Theft (1982). While the Court recognized that his last criminal

3

felony conviction was in 1982, in this case, CR-FE-2014-3478, the victim, a very elderly man,

4

hired Leytham as a handyman over several years. The evidence established that Leytham

5

repeatedly altered the checks written to him. For example, he altered a check from $25 to $2500,

6

another from $96.50 to $960.50, and another from $400 to $2400. Evidence was presented at
sentencing that Leytham had even accompanied the victim to the bank and tried to get him to

7

withdraw $10,000 and the teller, being suspicious, would only allow the elderly man to withdraw
8

$5,000.

9

In CR-FE-2014-5269, he stole a woman's purse in a Walmart and then was caught trying to

10

withdraw $300 from her ATM. At sentencing, he claimed he "found" her purse and was trying to

11

simply "deposit" the credit card in the ATM. However, he is actually seen on video stealing her

12

purse and seen trying to withdraw $300. While awaiting sentencing the State received more reports
of potential stealing from another elderly man for whom he worked as a handyman.

13

This post-conviction petition followed.

14

ANALYSIS

15

A post-conviction petition under the Uniform Post-Conviction Procedure Act is a civil

16

proceeding governed by the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure. Pizzuto v. State, 146 Idaho 720, 724,

17

202 P .3d 642, 646 (2008). A petitioner must prove by a preponderance of evidence the allegations
upon which the request for post-conviction relief is based. Hauschulz v. State, 144 Idaho 834, 838,

18

172 P.3d 1109, 1113 (2007); I.C.R. 57(c). Furthermore, admissible evidence supporting the
19

applicant's allegations must accompany the post-conviction petition, otherwise the application is

20

subject to dismissal. Adams v. State, 158 Idaho 530, _, 348 P.3d 145, 150-51 (2015); State v.

21

Payne, 146 Idaho 548, 561, 199 P.3d 123, 136 (2008) (citing LC.§ 19-4903). In fact, a petition for

22

post-conviction relief must be verified with respect to facts within the personal knowledge of the

23

petitioner, and affidavits, records, or other evidence supporting its allegations must be attached or
the petition must state why such supporting evidence is not included with the petition. Heilman v.

24
25
7

Amended from Embezzlement.
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e
State, 158 Idaho 139, _, 344 P.3d 919, 924 (Ct. App. 2015); LC. § 19-4903. In other words, the
1

petition must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations or the
2

petition will be subject to dismissal. Id. citing Wolf v. State, 152 Idaho 64, 67, 266 P.3d 1169,

3

1172 (Ct. App. 2011). Leytham's Petition and supporting affidavits do not comply with this

4

requirement.

5
6

The State moved for summary dismissal and Leytham opposed, requesting an evidentiary
hearing. LC. § 19-4906. 8 Leytham claims ineffective assistance of counsel and generally claimed
as follows:

7

1.

Trial counsel failed to investigate his medical issues;

2.

Trial counsel failed to adequately advise him on all matters necessary to enter an
informed guilty plea;

3.

Trial counsel and Leytham's relationship broke down;

4.
11

Trial counsel failed to inform Leytham of his rights and responsibilities under the
plea deal prior to entry of plea and misled him as what the court would do.

12

Leytham also claims, without any evidence to support his claims, that his medications impaired his

8

9

10

13

ability to enter an informed guilty plea.
The Court finds he failed to present sufficient evidence to raise a genuine issue of material

14

fact as to whether his representation was ineffective.

15

When considering summary dismissal, the Court must construe disputed facts in the

16

petitioner's favor, but the court is not required to accept either the petitioner's mere conclusory

17

allegations or factual assertions, unsupported by admissible evidence, or the petitioner's

18

conclusions oflaw. Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644,647,873 P.2d 898,901 (Ct.App.1994); Baruth

v. Gardner, 110 Idaho 156, 159, 715 P.2d 369, 372 (Ct. App.1986). Moreover, the Court, as the
19

trier of fact, is not constrained to draw inferences in favor of the party opposing the motion for
20

summary disposition; rather, the Court is free to arrive at the most probable inferences to be drawn

21

from uncontroverted evidence. Hayes v. State, 146 Idaho 353, 355, 195 P.3d 712, 714

22

(Ct.App.2008).

23
24
25

8 Idaho Code Section 19-4906 authorizes summary dismissal of a petition for post-conviction relief, either pursuant to
a motion by a party or upon the court's own initiative, if it appears from the pleadings, depositions, answers to
interrogatories, and admissions and agreements of fact, together with any affidavits submitted, that there is no genuine
issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.
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Claims may be summarily dismissed if the petitioner's allegations are clearly disproven by
1

the record of the criminal proceedings, if the petitioner has not presented evidence making a prima
2

facie case as to each essential element of the claims, or if the petitioner's allegations do not justify

3

relief as a matter of law. Keserovic v. State,_ Idaho_, 345 P.3d 1024, 1028-29 (Ct. App. 2015);

4

Kelly v. State, 149 Idaho 517,521,236 P.3d 1277, 1281 (2010); DeRushe v. State, 146 Idaho 599,

5

603, 200 P.3d 1148, 1152 (2009). If the petition, affidavits, and other evidence supporting the

6

petition allege facts that, if true, would entitle the petitioner to relief, the post-conviction claim
may not be summarily dismissed. Charboneau v. State, 140 Idaho 789, 792, 102 P.3d 1108, 1111

7

(2004); Sheahan v. State, 146 Idaho 101, 104, 190 P.3d 920, 923 (Ct. App. 2008). Only where a
8

genuine issue of material fact exists must the Court hold an evidentiary hearing to resolve the

9

factual issues. Goodwin, 138 Idaho at 272, 61 P.3d at 629. The Court finds that neither party

10

demonstrated a genuine issue of material fact exists. Therefore, the Court denies Leytham' s

11

request for an evidentiary hearing.
At its core, Leytham's claim for post-conviction relief is a claim for ineffective counsel. He

12

also claims that his guilty plea was coerced.
13

A.

Ineffective assistance of counsel standards.

14

There are two general categories of ineffective assistance of counsel and each is governed

15

by a different standard. While he is not explicit, a close reading of his claims shows that Leytham

16

makes claims under both. The first type is sometimes referred to as "actual ineffective assistance

17

of counsel" and is based on specific actions or omissions by counsel that resulted in prejudice to
the defendant. This is the more common ineffective assistance of counsel claim and the standard

18

applied to such claim is generally set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
19

The second category is often referred to as per se ineffective assistance of counsel or a

20

Cronic claim. See US. v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648, 662 (1984). Cronic only applies to circumstances

21

in which the defendant was actually or constructively denied the assistance of counsel and in such

22

cases, prejudice to the defendant is presumed and need not be established in order to be entitled to

23

relief.
Leytham casts most of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims as Strickland claims.

24
25

1.

Strickland claims.

In order to succeed on a claim of "actual ineffective assistance of counsel," Leytham must
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meet the two-prong test set forth in Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984); Mitchell v.
1

State, 132 Idaho 274, 277, 971 P.2d 727, 730 (1998). To prevail on this claim, Leytham must
2

demonstrate (1) counsel's performance fell below an objective standard of reasonableness, and (2)

3

there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, the result would have been different.

4

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 687-88, 692; Mitchell, 132 Idaho at 277, 971 P.2d at 730. While parties

5

often focus on the first prong, critically examining every decision made by trial counsel, they

6

virtually ignore the more important Strickland requirement -- prejudice. Even those decisions that
result from "inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings" do not

7

constitute ineffective assistance of counsel absent clear prejudice.
8

When evaluating an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, a court does not second-guess

9

strategic and tactical decisions, and such decisions cannot serve as a basis for post-conviction

10

relief unless the decision is shown to have resulted from inadequate preparation, ignorance of the

11

relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective review. Pratt v. State, 134 Idaho 581, 584,

12

6 P .3d 831, 834 (2000). "There is a strong presumption that counsel's performance fell within the
wide range of professional assistance." State v. Hairston, 133 Idaho 496, 511, 988 P.2d 1170, 1185

13

(1999) (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 P.2d 1174,

14

1176 (1988)). "To establish prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but

15

for the attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different."

16

Gilpin-Grubb v. State, 138 Idaho 76, 81, 57 P.3d 787, 792 (2002) (quoting Jakoski v. State, 136

17
18
19
20
21
22

23
24
25

Idaho 280,282, 32 P.3d 672,674 (Ct. App. 2001)).
"'Surmounting Strickland's high bar is never an easy task.' Padilla v. Kentucky,
559 U.S. ----, ---- [130 S.Ct. 1473, 1485, 176 L.Ed.2d 284] (2010). An ineffectiveassistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and forfeiture and
raise issues not presented at trial [or in pretrial proceedings], and so the Strickland
standard must be applied with scrupulous care, lest 'intrusive post-trial inquiry'
threaten the integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to
serve. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689-690 [104 S.Ct. 2052]. Even under de novo
review, the standard for judging counsel's representation is a most deferential one.
Unlike a later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings,
knew of materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing
counsel, and with the judge. It is 'all too tempting' to 'second-guess counsel's
assistance after conviction or adverse sentence.' Id, at 689 [ 104 S.Ct. 2052]; see
also Bell v. Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002);
Lockhart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993).
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1

2

The question is whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence
under 'prevailing professional norms,' not whether it deviated from best practices
or most common custom. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

Premo v. Moore, 131 S.Ct. 733, 739-40 (2011). Likewise, in another recent United States Supreme
3

Court case, the Supreme Court emphasized again how deferential a reviewing court should be to
4
5

6
7

8
9

10
11

12
13
14

15

trial counsel because:
An ineffective-assistance claim can function as a way to escape rules of waiver and
forfeiture and raise issues not presented at trial, and so the Strickland standard must
be applied with scrupulous care, lest "intrusive post-trial inquiry" threaten the
integrity of the very adversary process the right to counsel is meant to serve.
Strickland, 466 U.S., at 689-690, 104 S.Ct. 2052. Even under de nova review, the
standard for judging counsel's representation is a most deferential one. Unlike a
later reviewing court, the attorney observed the relevant proceedings, knew of
materials outside the record, and interacted with the client, with opposing counsel,
and with the judge. It is "all too tempting" to "second-guess counsel's assistance
after conviction or adverse sentence." Id., at 689, 104 S.Ct. 2052; see also Bell v.
Cone, 535 U.S. 685, 702, 122 S.Ct. 1843, 152 L.Ed.2d 914 (2002); Lockhart v.
Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 372, 113 S.Ct. 838, 122 L.Ed.2d 180 (1993). The question
is whether an attorney's representation amounted to incompetence under
"prevailing professional norms," not whether it deviated from best practices or most
common custom. Strickland, 466 U.S., at 690, 104 S.Ct. 2052.

Harrington v. Richter, 131 S.Ct. 770, 787 -788 (2011).
In other words, it is not enough for Leytham to simply show that his attorney's errors had
some conceivable effect on his case because virtually every act or omission of counsel would meet

16

that test; he must show the outcome would have been different. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693. "The

17

likelihood of a different result must be substantial, not just conceivable." Harrington v. Richter,

18

131 S.Ct. at 792 (citing Strickland, 466 U.S. at 693); see also Cullen v. Pinholster, 131 S.Ct. 1388,

19

1403 (2011) ("highly deferential" look at counsel's performance). It is not sufficient for counsel on

20

post-conviction to merely argue that trial counsel conducted the trial or other proceedings
differently than post-conviction counsel would have done. It is not even good enough to point out

21

that trial counsel committed a mistake in the law or the facts. Instead, post-conviction counsel
22

must establish that trial counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of

23

reasonableness, the defendant was prejudiced, and that the outcome of the trial would have been

24

different but for the deficient performance.

25

Even if that is established, Leytham must still prove by a preponderance of the evidence "a

26

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY DISMISSAL
CASE NO. CV-PC-2015-2841
14

000112

reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional errors, the result of the proceeding
1

would have been different." Estrada v. State, 143 Idaho 558, 565, 149 P.3d 833, 840 (2006)
2

(quoting Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694). "[R]easonable probability is a probability sufficient to

3

undermine confidence in the outcome." Id. As the United States Supreme Court wrote in

4

Strickland: "[i]n making this determination [referring to the prejudice prong], a court hearing an

5

ineffectiveness claim must consider the totality of the evidence before the judge or jury." 466 U.S.

6

at 696. The United States Supreme Court in Strickland carefully analyzed the prejudice required in
order to support a finding of ineffective assistance of counsel as follows:

7

8
9

10
11

An error by counsel, even if professionally unreasonable, does not warrant setting
aside the judgment of a criminal proceeding if the error had no effect on the
judgment. Cf United States v. Morrison, 449 U.S. 361, 364-365, 101 S.Ct. 665,
667-668, 66 L.Ed.2d 564 (1981 ). The purpose of the Sixth Amendment guarantee
of counsel is to ensure that a defendant has the assistance necessary to justify
reliance on the outcome of the proceeding. Accordingly, any deficiencies in
counsel's performance must be prejudicial to the defense in order to constitute
ineffective assistance under the Constitution.

***

12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21

It is not enough for the defendant to show that the errors had some conceivable
effect on the outcome of the proceeding. Virtually every act or omission of counsel
would meet that test, cf United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. 858, 866867, 102 S.Ct. 3440, 3446-3447, 73 L.Ed.2d 1193 (1982), and not every error that
conceivably could have influenced the outcome undermines the reliability of the
result of the proceeding. Respondent suggests requiring a showing that the errors
"impaired the presentation of the defense." Brief for Respondent 58. That standard,
however, provides no workable principle. Since any error, if it is indeed an error,
"impairs" the presentation of the defense, the proposed standard is inadequate
because it provides no way of deciding what impairments are sufficiently serious to
warrant setting aside the outcome of the proceeding.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 691-93 (emphasis added).

In fact, the prejudice component is so significant that a court is not required to even
analyze whether a trial counsel's performance was deficient before examining the prejudice aspect.
In addressing the prejudice component of an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the United

22

States Supreme Court made the following observation:
23
24

25

Although we have discussed the performance component of an ineffectiveness
claim prior to the prejudice component, there is no reason for a court deciding an
ineffective assistance claim to approach the inquiry in the same order or even to
address both components of the inquiry if the defendant makes an insufficient
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1
2
3

4
5

showing on one. In particular, a court need not determine whether counsel's
performance was deficient before examining the prejudice suffered by the
defendant as a result of the alleged deficiencies. The object of an ineffectiveness
claim is not to grade counsel's performance. If it is easier to dispose of an
ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack of sufficient prejudice, which we expect
will often be so, that course should be followed. Courts should strive to ensure that
ineffectiveness claims not become so burdensome to defense counsel that the entire
criminal justice system suffers as a result.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697 (emphasis added). Throughout Leytham' post-conviction argument, he

6

focuses on his trial counsel's performance substituting his judgment on strategic decisions and

7

virtually disregards whether any of their strategic decisions prejudiced his case.

8

9

As the United States Supreme Court observed, judicial scrutiny of trial counsel's
performance must be highly deferential because it is too easy for a court examining trial counsel's
defense after that defense has proven to be unsuccessful to conclude that a particular act or

10

omission was unreasonable. Cf Engle v. Isaac, 456 U.S. 107, 133-134, (1982).
11

12

13
14
15
16
17

18
19

20
21
22
23

24
25

Thus, a court deciding an actual ineffectiveness claim must judge the
reasonableness of counsel's challenged conduct on the facts of the particular case,
viewed as of the time of counsel's conduct. A convicted defendant making a claim
of ineffective assistance must identify the acts or omissions of counsel that are
alleged not to have been the result of reasonable professional judgment. The court
must then determine whether, in light of all the circumstances, the identified acts or
omissions were outside the wide range of professionally competent assistance. In
making that determination, the court should keep in mind that counsel's function,
as elaborated in prevailing professional norms, is to make the adversarial testing
process work in the particular case. At the same time, the court should recognize
that counsel is strongly presumed to have rendered adequate assistance and made
all significant decisions in the exercise of reasonable professional judgment.
These standards require no special amplification in order to define counsel's duty to
investigate, the duty at issue in this case. As the Court of Appeals concluded,
strategic choices made after thorough investigation of law and facts relevant to
plausible options are virtually unchallengeable; and strategic choices made after
less than complete investigation are reasonable precisely to the extent that
reasonable professional judgments support the limitations on investigation. In other
words, counsel has a duty to make reasonable investigations or to make a
reasonable decision that makes particular investigations unnecessary. In any
ineffectiveness case. a particular decision not to investigate must be directly
assessed for reasonableness in all the circumstances. applying a heavy measure of
deference to counsel's judgments.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690-691 (emphasis added).
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2.
1

2

Cronic claims.

In contrast, Cronic was a companion case to Strickland. While the Strickland standard is
appropriate for the overwhelming majority of his ineffective assistance of counsel claims, Cronic

3

recognized that in rare circumstances counsel's conduct may be so bad that it is per se ineffective.

4

Here, Leytham claims that the relationship between his trial counsel and him broke down to the

5

point he failed to subject the case to meaningful adversarial testing. This is a Cronic claim. In
Cronic, the Supreme Court reasoned that, "absent some effect of challenged conduct on the

6

reliability of the trial process, the Sixth Amendment guarantee is generally not implicated."
7

8

Cronic, 466 U.S. at 662. The circumstances in which prejudice could be presumed are limited.

Those circumstances include:
[M]ost obvious, of course, is the complete denial of counsel. The presumption that
counsel's assistance is essential requires us to conclude that a trial is unfair if the
accused is denied counsel at a critical stage of his trial. Similarly, if counsel entirely
fails to subject the prosecution's case to meaningful adversarial testing, then there
has been a denial of Sixth Amendment rights that makes the adversary process
itself presumptively unreliable.

9

10
11

12

13

Id. at 659. In summary, Cronic delineated three limited circumstances to which the per se rule

would apply: (1) state or court actions, (2) failure to subject the case to meaningful adversarial
14

testing, and (3) conflict of interest.
15

If state actions result in an actual or constructive denial of assistance of counsel, prejudice

16

may be presumed. Leytham does not allege that any state actions or court actions caused an actual

17

or constructive denial of assistance of counsel. Examples encompassed by Cronic include denial of

18

counsel at a critical stage of the case9 or appointing new counsel a day before trial in a high profile

19

capital murder case. 10
B.

20

Leytham's ineffective assistance of counsel claims fail.

1.

The Court dismisses Leytham's failure to investigate claim.

21

Leytham claimed that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to investigate his alleged

22

medical condition and obtain medical records. However, he does not explain how it would have

23

24

Where a defendant was prohibited by the court from consulting with his attorney during an overnight recess of the
trial, the Supreme Court found prejudice was presumed. See Geders v. US., 425 U.S. 80 (1976).

25

See e.g., Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932). However, the mere tardy appointment of counsel does not
automatically require reversal of every conviction. Chambers v. Maroney, 399 U.S. 42 (1970).

9

10
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e
changed the Court's sentence. Sparks v. State, 140 Idaho 292, 92 P.3d 542 (Ct. App. 2004) (citing
1

State v. Zichko, 129 Idaho 259,263, 923 P.2d 966, 970 (1996)).
2
3

4

Moreover, the record also belies his complaint. According to the record, the Court
discussed the adequacy of the investigation during the plea hearing, inquiring in part, as follows:
Q:
Have you reviewed the evidence that was provided to your attorney
provided [sic] during discovery?

5

A:
6
7

Q:
Is there anything that your attorney has-that you've asked your attorney to
do that he has not done?
A:

8
9

Yes, I have.

No, ma'am.

Q:
And have you told your attorney everything that you know about these
crimes?

A:

Yes, ma'am

Q:

Have you had enough time to talk to your attorney?

A:

Yes, ma'am.

12

Q:

Are there witnesses who can demonstrate you are innocent of this crime?

13

A:

No, ma'am.

10
11

14

(Tr., pg. 24, ln.17 to pg. 25, ln.8.) Furthermore, while he quotes from a part of the record, the
transcript is taken out of context. The Court was merely observing that there was no basis for his

15

present claims at sentencing that he was suffering from some major illness like Lupus. It was not
16

critical to sentencing and was collateral at best.

17

Finally, Leytham in fact presented all of his medical records to the Court in support of his

18

Rule 35 and the Court denied his motion even in the face of these medical records. Therefore, he

19

cannot prove any alleged failure prejudiced him or affected the outcome.

20

This claim fails and the Court dismisses it.

21

2.

The Court dismisses Leytham's claim that trial counsel failed to adequately advise
him with regard to entering a guilty plea.

22

Leytham generally claims his guilty plea was not entered voluntarily and knowingly. He

23

supports this allegation by claiming his trial counsel misrepresented what the Court would do at
sentencing. He also claims trial counsel failed to advise him about his appellate rights. Finally he

24

claims his guilty plea was not knowing and voluntary because he did not understand the restitution
25

he agreed to pay.
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1

Allegation that he was misled as to his sentence does not support postconviction relief

2

Leytham claims he pied guilty because counsel assured him he would receive probation;

3

however, the record demonstrates that Leytham pied guilty knowing that probation was not

a.

4

guaranteed and that he was facing a potential nineteen (19) year sentence without possibility of
parole. Leytham was present when the Court inquired of the State whether the State could argue

5

for imposition, saying, "you can argue for imposition[?]" (Tr., pg. 6, Ins. 13-15.) To which the

6

State replied, "Yes, Your Honor." (Tr., pg. 6, In. 15.) The Court explained the plea was not

7

binding directly with Leytham. The following exchange occurred:
Q:
What that means is that I can actually give you a 14-year prison sentence in
the forgery case and a five-year prison sentence in the financial transaction card
case and I can run them consecutive to each other for a total of 19 years without the
possibility of parole. Do you understand that?

8
9

10

A:
11

Yes, ma'am.

Q:
And I'm not required to follow recommendations of either counsel. Do you
understand that?

12

A:

Yes ma'am.

13

(Tr., pg. 23, Ins. 3-14). Clearly, Leytham knew that that there was the possibility of a prison
14

sentence.

15

This is significant because, even assuming that his trial counsel failed to adequately explain

16

the potential sentence, 11 the Court's careful colloquy with him, plus the guilty plea form he filled

17

out under oath, establishes that he knew a prison sentence was possible. As the Idaho Supreme

18

Court recently ruled, where the Court adequately informs a defendant and the record conclusively
proves he was informed properly by the Court, a petitioner cannot establish that the outcome

19

would have changed but for his attorney's ineffectiveness. Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 167-68,

20

321 P.3d 709, 717-18 (2014). Here the record clearly proves Leytham understood the Court was

21

free to impose the sentence it did.
Applying the Idaho Supreme Court's decision in Booth, Leytham has also failed to

22
23

demonstrate that " there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's errors, he would not have

24

For the purposes of this decision the Court has assumed Leytham's factual assertion to be true, thus making an
evidentiary hearing unnecessary.
11

25
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pleaded guilty and would have insisted on going to trial." Booth v. State, 151 Idaho 612, 621, 262
1

P.3d 255,264 (2011) (quoting Ridgley v. State, 148 Idaho 671,676,227 P.3d 925, 930 (2010)).
2

Thus, the Court dismisses this claim.

3

b.

4

Allegation that his trial counsel failed to advise him about his appellate rights
does not support post-conviction relief.

Leytham complains that his trial counsel failed to advise him about his appeal rights.
5

However, like the previous claim, the record clearly establishes that the Court in fact advised him

6

both in writing and verbally that he had a right to appeal and that it must be filed within forty-two

7

(42) days. The Court stated at the end of sentencing as follows:
Now, you have the right to appeal my decision. If you wish to appeal, you have to
do so within 42 days of the date judgment is made and filed. In making that appeal
you may be represented by an attorney. And if you cannot afford one, one will be
appointed to represent you at public expense.

8
9

10

(Tr., pg. 64, lns. 14-20). Likewise, the Court's judgments clearly set forth Leytham's appeal rights.
11

While the failure to advise a defendant of his appeal rights would fall below an objective standard

12

of reasonableness, Leytham cannot show that it prejudiced him because this Court unmistakably

13

did advise him. Murray, 156 Idaho at 167-68, 321 P.3d at 717-18.
Therefore, even assuming his claim to be true, like the previous claim, the Court dismisses

14
15

it.

16

Allegation that his trial counsel failed to advise him about the amount of
restitution does not support post-conviction relief.

17

Leytham now claims that his trial counsel was ineffective because he did not adequately

c.

18

advise him about the potential restitution. However, the plea agreement expressly included
restitution as a condition of the plea agreement, even on the dismissed charges and on DR# 2014-

19

411861.12 Both the Court and the State placed the restitution requirement on the record. (Tr., pg. 4,
20

lns. 10-15.). The Court specifically clarified that as part of the plea agreement Leytham agreed to

21

pay restitution on all of the dismissed charges, restitution on case DR-20 14-41181, with such

22

restitution being subject to a civil judgment. (Tr., pg. 4, ln.10 to pg. 6, In. 23; pg. 8, lns. 15-25).

23

After describing the restitution he agreed to pay by pleading guilty, the Court confirmed with

24

This investigation involved his defrauding Washington Federal Savings and is the restitution imposed in Case No.
CR-FE-2014-3478.
12

25
26

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY DISMISSAL
CASE NO. CV-PC-2015-2841
20

000118

defense counsel that the Court's understating was "an accurate reflection of the plea agreement."
1

(Tr., pg. 8, lns. 1-3).
2
3

4
5
6
7

8
9

10

Moreover, the Court specifically inquired whether Leytham understood that he was
agreeing to pay restitution by pleading guilty.
Now you understand that you're agreeing to pay restitution in all of these
Q.
cases including the dismissed cases. Do you understand that?
A.

Yes, ma'am.

Q.
And you're also agreeing to pay restitution in the case that's the DR case,
2014-411861. Do you understand that?
A.

And which one would that be, ma'am?

Q.

That's the one that- it's the one that they're not going to file on.

A.

Yes.

(Tr., pg. 23, ln.15 to pg. 24, ln.l). The Court continued:

11

Q.
And do you understand again about the requirement that you're going to
have to pay restitution to your victims?

12

A.

13
14

Q.
And I noticed that you crossed yes and then it looks like over no it says -you wrote L -- it looks like a signature but I'm not positive. It looks like an initial.
But do you understand that you have to pay restitution to the victims?

15

A.

16

Yes ma'am.

Yes, ma'am.

(Tr., pg. 27, lns. 7-17).
Restitution ultimately amounted to $55,331.92 and $202.75 in Leytham's cases. Leytham

17

clearly acknowledged that he understood that he was obligated to pay restitution, including on
18

DR#2014-411861, and that he was aware of the amount of restitution. He acknowledged this

19

responsibility multiple times directly to the Court and through his attorney. Furthermore, Leytham

20

agreed that he had access to discovery documents that indicated restitution would be significant in

21

his cases. The restitution amounts are in those discovery documents. The exact amount ultimately

22

agreed to, $55,331.92, is in police reports, DR#2014-411861, which were provided to Leytham
and his counsel prior to the plea. Leytham testified he had reviewed the discovery prior to the plea.

23

Leytham's attorney stated as follows:
24
25

THE COURT: Is that -- is the amount of restitution, is that something he's going to
be agreeing to?
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MR. NEVILLE: It is, Your Honor.
1

THE COURT: And do you believe there's a sufficient basis to impose those
amounts?

2

MR. NEVILLE: I do.

3

(Tr., pg. 36, Ins. 8-14). As the State noted, the same police reports were also in the presentence
4

report which Leytham told the Court he had read.
5

There is no evidence to support his conclusory claim that he and his counsel did not discuss

6

the restitution amount, especially in the face of the record. Leytham' s application must present or

7

be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or the application will be

8

subject to dismissal; there is no requirement that the court give evidentiary value to mere

9

conclusory allegations that are unsupported by admissible evidence. Drapeau v. State, 103 Idaho
612,617,651 P.2d 546,551 (Ct.App.1982).

10

Under these circumstances we hold that, to justify an evidentiary hearing in a postconviction relief proceeding, it is incumbent upon the applicant to tender a factual
showing based upon evidence that would be admissible at the hearing. His
application must be supported by written statements from witnesses who are able to
give testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge, or must be based
upon otherwise verifiable information. Absent the witnesses or verifiability of the
facts to which they could testify, we hold the application fails to raise material
issues of fact sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing.

11

12
13
14
15

16

Id.
The Court dismisses this claim and finds it does not support post-conviction relief.

17

3.

The Court dismisses Leytham's claim that trial counsel was ineffective by failing to
advise him about his Estrada rights.

18

Leytham claims that his trial counsel failed to advise him that he had a right to remain

19

silent during his presentence report investigation. However, this will not sustain post-conviction

20

relief because, even if true, the guilty plea advisory form he completed and the Court's colloquy
with him when it took his plea clearly establish that he was informed by the Court. They prove that

21
22

23
24
25

Leytham understood his right to remain silent during all the examinations before pleading guilty.
As discussed above, the Idaho Supreme Court recently addressed a similar Estrada claim
arising in a similar context. Murray, 156 Idaho 159, 168,321 P.3d 709, 718.
There, the Court held, where the record establishes a defendant fully understood his
or her Estrada rights and voluntarily waived them; the defendant fails to establish
prejudice by demonstrating a substantial likelihood of a different result had the
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1

2
3

attorney's representation not been deficient. Id at 168, 321 P.3d at 718. The
situation here is analogous to that in Murray. Grant was aware of his right not to
participate in the evaluation and has failed to demonstrate how having his attorney
additionally advise him of this right would have made any difference. Thus, Grant
failed to allege the possibility of a valid claim. Therefore, the district court properly
refused to appoint counsel on this claim.

4

Grant v. State, 329 P.3d 380, 387, 156 Idaho 598, 605 (Ct. App. 2014). Therefore, while a failure

5

to inform him of his Estrada rights would fall below

6
7

The Court dismisses this claim and finds it does not support post-conviction relief because
he cannot show he was prejudiced by the failure, if any. While such a failure would fall below an
objective standard of reasonableness, Leytham cannot show that it prejudiced him because this

8

Court unmistakably did advise him. Murray, 156 Idaho at 167-68, 321 P.3d at 717-18.
9

4.

10
11

The Court dismisses Leytham's claim that trial counsel was ineffective for not
reviewing his presentence report with him.

Leytham argues his attorney provided ineffective assistance by not reviewing the
presentence investigation report with him. First, the record indicates that when asked by the Court

12

during sentencing whether he had read the presentence report, Leytham said "yes, ma'am." (Tr.,
13
14
15
16

17

pg. 37, Ins. 3-5). The Court later asks his attorney whether shared a copy of the I.C. § 19-2522 with
Leytham and his attorney, Mr. Neville stated:
I have, Your Honor. And it think it's important I put on the record he was not able
to read that just due to some health problems, so I actually read it to him.
(Tr., pg. 37, Ins. 4-7). When asked whether there were corrections, again his counsel noted a
correction to the 19-2522 evaluation, implying that Leytham brought that to his attention.

18

Second, like the defendant in Jones v. State, while he complains that his counsel was

19

ineffective by failing to go over the presentence report with him, assuming that to be true, he fails

20

to identify what errors or omissions, if any, he would want corrected or what information he would
have introduced. He fails to explain how this alleged failure affected the outcome or the "resulting

21

prejudice".
22
23
24
25

now that Jones has seen the report, he has failed to allege in his application for
post-conviction relief what errors, if any, appear in the presentence investigation
report and any resulting prejudice. Under the summary dismissal procedure as
outlined by LC. § 19-4906(c), the court may grant a summary dismissal if there is
no genuine issue of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law. Even assuming the facts alleged in Jones' affidavits are true, Jones
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1

2
3

4

has failed to allege any errors or corrections he would have made at sentencing.
Because he has failed to indicate what errors were contained in the presentence
report that resulted in prejudice, Jones is not entitled to relief. Therefore, the state,
as a matter of law, is entitled to summary judgment. The district court did not err in
summarily dismissing the application for post-conviction relief on these g
Jones v. State, 870 P.2d 1, 3, 125 Idaho 294,296 (Ct. App. 1994)

Like Jones, he is not entitled to post-conviction relief on this basis and the claim is
5

6

dismissed.

5.

7

The Court dismisses Leytham's claim that trial counsel was ineffective by telling
him to remain silent at sentencing.

Leytham complains that his trial counsel was ineffective because he advised him to be
8

silent when the Court asked whether he wanted to make a statement. For the purposes of this post9

conviction, the Court assumes this to be true. (The Court notes that he also wrote a letter to the

10

Court which the Court considered and made part of the presentence report with the consent of

11

counsel.) This does not entitle him to post-conviction relief.

12
13

Advising a client not to speak during sentencing is a tactical decision. Leytham did not
show or even argue his counsel's choice of tactics was "was unsound or that it resulted from any
shortcomings in counsel's knowledge or preparation." Buck v. State, 124 Idaho 155, 160, 857 P.2d

14

634, 639 (Ct. App. 1993). Assuming it happened and that it was not a strategic decision not to be
15
16

second guessed on post-conviction, Leytham also introduced no evidence of what he would have
said that would have affected the outcome. In other words, he has not identified any prejudice.

17

The Court dismisses this claim.

18

6.

19
20

21
22

The Court dismisses Leytham' s claims related to an alleged breakdown of his
relationship with his trial counsel.

Leytham claims his relationship with his trial counsel broke down and as a result his
counsel was ineffective, making Cronic potentially applicable.
The Sixth Amendment does not guarantee a "meaningful relationship" between a client and
his attorney. Morris v. Slappy, 461 U.S. 1, 14 (1983). However, forcing a defendant to go to trial
with an attorney with whom he has an irreconcilable conflict amounts to constructive denial of the

23

Sixth Amendment right to counsel. Brown v. Craven, 424 F.2d 1166, 1170 (9th Cir. 1970). An
24
25

irreconcilable conflict in violation of the Sixth Amendment occurs only where there is a complete
breakdown in communication between the attorney and client, and the breakdown prevents
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effective assistance of counsel. Schell v. Witek, 218 F.3d 1017, 1026 (9th Cir. 2000).
1

Disagreements over strategic or tactical decisions do not rise to level of a complete breakdown in
2

communication. Id.

3

In this case, even assuming the relationship to have been strained, the record is clear that

4

there was not a complete breakdown of communication. Furthermore, Leytham failed to identify

5

what resulted from that alleged breakdown. Therefore, this claim fails.

6

c.

There is no evidence that his medications affected his ability to enter his plea.
Like the defendant in Workman, while not explicitly argued, Leytham suggests that his plea

7

was involuntary because his medication. However, other than his bald assertion, Leytham does not
8

support his claim with any admissible evidence, especially in the face of the record. Leytham's

9

application must present or be accompanied by admissible evidence supporting its allegations, or

10

the application will be subject to dismissal; there is no requirement that the court give evidentiary

11

value to mere conclusory allegations that are unsupported by admissible evidence. Drapeau, 103
Idaho at 617, 651 P.2d at 551.

12

13
14
15
16
17
18

Under these circumstances we hold that, to justify an evidentiary hearing in a postconviction relief proceeding, it is incumbent upon the applicant to tender a factual
showing based upon evidence that would be admissible at the hearing. His
application must be supported by written statements from witnesses who are able to
give testimony themselves as to facts within their knowledge, or must be based
upon otherwise verifiable information. Absent the witnesses or verifiability of the
facts to which they could testify, we hold the application fails to raise material
issues of fact sufficient to justify an evidentiary hearing.
Id. The record also belies his assertions. This is the colloquy the Court had with Leytham while he
was under oath.

20

Q.
Now, you've indicated that you've been taking a pill for depression as well
as some other medications and some Hydrocodone for your neck pain; is that
correct?

21

A.

Yes, Your Honor.

Q.

Are you having any difficulty understanding these proceedings?

A.

No, ma'am.

19

22
23

24

Q.
And you have been taking all of these medications for some time, about 45
days you said?

25

A.

Just take depression for 45. The rest of them I've been taking since 2005.
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e
1

2

Q.
Okay. Normally by this time in any of these medications any effects have
stabilized. But I just want to make sure are you having any sleepiness or any
difficulty understanding what we 're talking about here today?
A.

3

4
5

6
7

8

No, Your Honor.

And do you feel that these medications prevented you from knowingly and
Q.
voluntarily deciding to plead guilty?
A.

No, Your Honor.

Q.

Did they make you more susceptible to Mr. Blender's suggestions?

A.

Yes, Your Honor.

Q.
They did? So your -- Mr. Blender's suggestion -- these medications made
you more susceptible to those?
A.

No, ma'am. I'm sorry. I misunderstood you.

Q.

You misunderstood my question?

10

A.

Yes,ma'am.

11

Q.

Okay. And so these are your decisions, not Mr. Blender's decisions?

A.

Yes,ma'am.

9

12

And. again. just for the record. his answers seem appropriate to me. his
affect is appropriate. We've got great eye contact. He's not slurring his words. He
doesn 't appear sleepy. His answers do not seem inappropriate to me. Is there
anyone here who would disagree with that?
Q.

13
14

15

MS. DUNN: No, Your Honor.

16

THE COURT: Mr. Blender?

17

MR. BLENDER: No, Your Honor. I agree with what he said.
THE COURT: Mr. Leytham?

18

THE DEFENDANT: I agree with what you said, ma'am.

19

THE COURT: Great.

20

Q. BY THE COURT: Now, a couple more questions. You're under the care of a
Dr. Fred Rice; is that right?

21
22

A.
Yes, I am. He is one of my clients plus he's also a psychologist and I talk to
him once in a while.

Q.

Well, who is prescribing the depression medication?

A.
Care.

That would be my doctor, Dr. Fox, Michael Fox out of Kuna Advanced

24

25

Q.

Okay. So you've been seeing these people for some time?

23
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e
A.

Yes, ma' am.

1

2
3

Q.
What was the diagnosis that you got? You said you were diagnosed in 1979.
Tell me what that was.
A.

I'm a schizophrenic and a split personality, ma'am.

Q.

Okay. So what are you taking for schizophrenia? 13

A.

Nothing. I grew out of that within years.

4
5
6

Q.
Okay. Is there anything else that you think might affect your ability to
understand the questions or make a decision in this case?
A.

No, ma'am.

7

(Tr., pg. 19, ln.25 to pg. 22, ln.24) (emphasis added).
8

Leytham does not claim he was not competent to enter a guilty plea and, in fact, there is no

9

evidence he was not competent. The issue is whether Leytham knowingly, willingly, and

10
11

12
13

14
15

voluntarily entered a guilty plea.
For a guilty plea to be valid, the entire record must demonstrate that the plea was
entered into in a voluntary, knowing, and intelligent manner. State v. Heredia, 144
Idaho 95, 96, 156 P.3d 1193, 1194 (2007). Whether a plea is voluntary and
understood entails inquiry into three areas: (1) whether the defendant's plea was
voluntary in the sense that he understood the nature of the charges and was not
coerced; (2) whether the defendant knowingly and intelligently waived his rights to
a jury trial; and (3) whether the defendant understood the consequences of pleading
guilty. State v. Colyer, 98 Idaho 32, 34, 557 P.2d 626,628 (1976).

Workman v. State, 144 Idaho 518, 527-28, 164 P.3d 798, 807-08 (2007). Like Workman, Leytham
16

suggests that his guilty plea was involuntary because, at the time he entered it, he was medicated.
17

However, the colloquy clearly establishes that Leytham had the mental capacity and understanding

18

and he aware that he was medicated but did not believe the drug affected his understanding of his

19

guilty plea.

20
21
22

In fact, the Court carefully put on the record its own observations and asked whether
anyone disagreed. Even Leytham agreed with the Court's observations.

And. again. ;ust for the record. his answers seem appropriate to me. his
Q.
affect is appropriate. We've got great eye contact. He's not slurring his words. He

23

24
25

13 The Court ordered an LC. § 19-2522 evaluation and the psychologist diagnosed him with Dysthymic Disorder with a
provisional diagnosis of Generalized Anxiety Disorder. He also diagnosed him with a Personality Disorder and
Borderline Intellectual functioning. Nothing in the evaluation suggested he was not competent.
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1
2
3

doesn't appear sleepy. His answers do not seem inappropriate to me. Is there
anyone here who would disagree with that?
(Emphasis added.) In fact, Leytham stated as follows:
THE DEFENDANT: I agree with what you said, ma'am.

(Emphasis added.)
4

Thus, is not a basis to grant him post-conviction relief and the Court denies his claim.
5

CONCLUSION

6

Having reviewed the Petition, and any evidence in a light most favorable to Leytham and

7

having considered the oral argument, the Court finds that it is satisfied that Leytham is not entitled

8

to post-conviction relief. I.C. § 19-4906(2). The Court further finds there is no dispute of material

9

fact and no purpose would be served by any further proceedings. Repp v. State, 136 Idaho 262,
_ , 32 P.3d 156, 157-58 (Ct. App. 2001). Therefore, the Court hereby grants the State's motion

10

and dismisses Leytham's Petition.
11

12

IT IS SO ORDERED.

13
14

Dated this 28th day of August 2015.

lt.uu... 6-f! 'ii,

15

Cheri C. Copsey, District J~e
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
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ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY DISMISSAL
CASE NO. CV-PC-2015-2841
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The undersigned authority hereby certifies that on August

2J , 2015, I mailed (served) a

1

true and correct copy of the ORDER GRANTING MOTION as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d)
2

I.C.R. to each of the parties below as follows:

3

4
5

JAN M. BENNETTS
ADA COUNTY PROSECUTING ATTORNEY
SHAWNA DUNN
INTERDEPT. MAIL

6
7

8

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDERS OFFICE
LANCE FUISTING
INTERDEPT. MAIL

9

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH

10
11

12
13
14

Date:

rLub
l

I

15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26

ORDER GRANTING SUMMARY DISMISSAL
CASE NO. CV-PC-2015-2841
29
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AUG 28 2015
· rl!STOPHER D. RICH, Clerk
Sy KRISTI OUMON
DEPUTY

1

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF

2

THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA

3
4
5

JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,

6

Case No. CV-PC-2015-2841

Petitioner,

7
8

9

vs.

JUDGMENT
STATE OF IDAHO,

10

Respondent.

11
12

JUDGMENT IS ENTERED AS FOLLOWS: the Petition is dismissed with prejudice.

13
14
15
16

Dated this 28th day of August 2015.

17
18

19

Cheri C. Copsey
District Judge

20
21

22
23
24
25

26
27
28

29
30
31
JUDGMENT

1
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1
2

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

3
1-"'

4
5

The undersigned certifies that on August

2t_,

2015, I mailed one copy of the

JUDGMENT as notice pursuant to Rule 77(d) I.C.R. to each of the parties addressed as follows:

6
7

8

ADA COUNTY PROSECUTOR'S OFFICE
SHAWNA DUNN
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

9

10
11

ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER'S OFFICE
LANCE FUISTING
INTERDEPARTMENTAL MAIL

12
13
14
15
16
17
18

19
20
21
22
23
24
25

26
27

28

29
30
31
JUDGMENT

2

000129

•
ADA COUNTY PUBLIC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant
LANCE L. FUISTING, ISB #7791
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,
Case No. CV-PC-2015-2841
Petitioner-Appellant,
NOTICE OF APPEAL
vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Respondent.

TO:

THE ABOVE-NAMED RESPONDENT, STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK
OF THE ABOVE-ENTITLED COURT.

NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT:
1) The above-named Appellant appeals against the above-named respondent to
the Idaho Supreme Court from the final decision and order entered against
him in the above-entitled action on August 28, 2015, the Honorable Cher C.
Copsey, District Judge presiding.
2) That the party has a right to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the
judgments or orders described in paragraph 1 above are appealable orders
under, and pursuant to, IAR 11 (a)(1-9).
3) A preliminary statement of the issues on appeal, which the Appellant then
intends to assert in the appeal, provided any such list of issues on appeal
shall not prevent the Appellant from asserting other issues on appeal is:
a) Did the District Court err in granting summary dismissal of Mr.
Leytham's Post Conviction claims?

1

NOTICE OF APPEAL

000130

4) Reporter's Transcript. The Appellant requests the preparation of the entire
reporter's standard transcript as defined by IAR 25(c). The Appellant also
requests the preparation of the additional portions of the reporter's transcript:
a) Status Conference hearing held June 17, 2015 (Court Reporter: Maria
Glodowski. Estimated pages: 50).
5) Clerk's Record. The Appellant requests the standard clerk's record pursuant
to IAR 28(b)(1). In addition to those documents automatically included under
IAR 28(b)(1), Appellant also requests that any briefs, statements or affidavits
considered by the court, and memorandum opinions or decisions of the court
be included in the Clerk's Record.
6) I certify:
a) That a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served on the Court
Reporter(s) mentioned in paragraph 5 above.
b) That the Appellant is exempt from paying the estimated fee for the
preparation of the record because the Appellant is indigent. (I.C. §§ 313220, 31-3220A, IAR 24(e)).
c) That there is no appellate filing fee since this is an appeal in a criminal
case (I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, IAR 23(a)(10)).
d) Ada County will be responsible for paying for the reporter's transcript,
as the client is indigent (I.C. §§ 31-3220, 31-3220A, IAR 24(e)).
e) That service has been made upon all parties required to be served
pursuant to IAR 20.
DATED this

<]-b1't day of Septembe-r-20___[_5_.l___..___~t.___-- - - - - - Lance L. Fuisting
Attorney for Petitioner

2

NOTICE OF APPEAL
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••
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY, that on this

~

day of September 2015, I mailed (served) a

true and correct copy of the within instrument to:
Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Division
Joe R. Williams Bldg., 4th Fir.
Statehouse Mail
Idaho Appellate Public Defender
3050 North Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83703
Maria Glodowski
Court Reporter
Interdepartmental Mail
Shawna Dunn
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Interdepartmental Mail

Quincy

.

NOTICE OF APPEAL

3
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SEI' II

count'} C\or\<
ADA cou~'uBUC DEFENDER
Attorneys for Petitioner-Appellant

FILED

A,f.l,_._ _ _ _ P.M.

LANCE L. FUISTING, ISB #7791
Deputy Public Defender
200 West Front Street, Suite 1107
Boise, Idaho 83702
Telephone: (208) 287-7400
Facsimile: (208) 287-7409

m--

SEP 1 0 20~5
CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, ,.,sc:
9y ~ETH MASTE}·!~,
:,:?Ui'I

IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,
Case No. CV-PC-2015-2841
Petitioner-Appellant,
ORDER APPOINTING STATE
APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER ON
DIRECT APPEAL

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent-Respondent.

Petitioner has elected to pursue a direct appeal in the above-entitled matter.
Petitioner being indigent and having heretofore been represented by the Ada County
Public Defender's office in the District Court, the Court finds that, under these
circumstances, appointment of appellate counsel is justified. The Idaho State Appellate
Public Defender shall be appointed to represent the above-named Petitioner in all
matters pertaining to the direct appeal.
SO ORDERED AND DATED this

--'-t,
(0

day of September 2015.

Cher C. Copsey
District Judge

1

ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER ON DIRECT APPEAL
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
mailed one copy of the Order Appointing State Appellate Public Defender on Direct
Appeal as notice pursuant to the Idaho Rules to each of the parties of record in this
case in envelopes addressed as follows:
Idaho Attorney General
Criminal Division
Joe R. Williams Bldg., 4th Fir.
Statehouse Mail
Idaho Appellate Public Defender
3050 North Lake Harbor Lane, Suite 100
Boise, Idaho 83703
Shawna Dunn
Ada County Prosecutor's Office
Interdepartmental Mail
Ada County Public Defender
Attn: Jacob Precht
Interdepartmental Mail

CHRISTOPHER D. RICH
Clerk of the District Court
Ada County, Idaho

/

Date:. __~_._10_·_,~--------

By

~ l Ii__ A[_~~:~

Deputy Clerk:, .~~ · , c: · .,.

2

ORDER APPOINTING STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER ON DIRECT APPEAL
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No.
A.M,

To:

Stephen W. Kenyon - Sctfilings@idcourts.net

-----

FiLE:o

-----P.M.~

ocr 28 -

CHtusnop

HEA

2015-

By K12LL12 D. AICH.

Dep;%$Gf2N£2R , Clerk

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

STATE OF IDAHO,

PETITIONER-APPELLANT
vs.

·

Docket No. 43551-2015

JifvlMY D. LEYTHAM,
RESPONDENT-RESPONDENT

NOTICE OF TRANSCRIPT LODGED
Notice is hereby given that on October 27, 2015,
pursuant to Court order, a transcript of the proceedings
before the Hon. Cheri C. Copsey, on June 17, 2015,
(8 pages in length) was lodged with the District Court
Clerk of Ada County in the Fourth Judicial District for
inclusion in the above-entitled appeal.

~ ~ ~ , , ,. -,
M&M COURT REPORTING
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· IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,
Supreme Court Case No. 43551
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS

vs.
STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.

I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of
the State ofldaho in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify:
There were no exhibits offered for identification or admitted into evidence during the
course of this action.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the following documents will be submitted as EXHIBITS to
the Record:
1. Transcript of proceedings held September 10, 2014 and December 31, 2014, Boise,
Idaho, filed April 22, 2015
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of the said
Court this 28th day of October, 2015.

.,,,,,........,,
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CHRISTOPHER D. RJ~rtH lUD1;'1, ,
Clerk of the Distric1fg_g~•· 0 • • • • • •• 4/',.,
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Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,
Supreme Court Case No. 43551
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, the undersigned authority, do hereby certify that I have
personally served or mailed, by either United States Mail or Interdepartmental Mail, one copy of
the following:
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT
to each of the Attorneys of Record in this cause as follows:

STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER

LAWRENCEG. WASDEN

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT

ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT

BOISE, IDAHO

BOISE, IDAHO

CHRISTOPHER D. RICM,''" 111111111,,,
; 11,,"
Clerk of the District C,.0lirt\
l\'l.;~.:V.D1
0.r.4
., ~"•
•
~ C)',J ••

.

Date of Service:

QCT 2 8 2015
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~
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Deputy Clerk
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF ADA
JIMMY D. LEYTHAM,

Supreme Court Case No. 43551
Petitioner-Appellant,
CERTIFICATE TO RECORD

vs.

STATE OF IDAHO,
Respondent.
I, CHRISTOPHER D. RICH, Clerk of the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District of the
State ofldaho, in and for the County of Ada, do hereby certify that the above and foregoing record in
the above-entitled cause was compiled under my direction and is a true and correct record of the
pleadings and documents that are automatically required under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appellate Rules,
as well as those requested by Counsel.
I FURTHER CERTIFY, that the Notice of Appeal was filed in the District Court on the
8th day of September, 2015.

CHRISTOPHER D. RIC~,,111111111 ' '1,,,
1,,,
Clerk of the District CQ~~'\
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